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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
BREUER-HARRISON, INC., CASPER
J. BREUER AND WILLIAM M.
HARRISON,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
vs.
KEITH AND EVELYN COMBE,
Defendants and Appellants,
Case No. 880353-CA
and
ATTORNEYS TITLE GUARANTEE
FUND, INC., AND ROBERT E.
FROERER,
Defendants and Respondents.
Appeal from the Second Judicial District Court
Weber County, State of Utah
Honorable Ronald O. Hyde, Judge Presiding
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS BREUER AND HARRISON
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This is an appeal from a judgment rendered in a civil
contract and tort action, in the Second Judicial

District

Court of Weber County, the Honorable Ronald O. Hyde, Judge,
presiding.
Supreme
2

The

Court,

appeal

pursuant

was
to

( 3 ) (J) (1953 as amended).

initially
Utah

Code

taken
Ann.

to

the

Section

Utah
78-2-

The appeal was then transferred

to the Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section
78-2-2(4) and 78-2A-3(2)(J) (1953 as amended).
Jurisdictional questions regarding the finality of the
1

a credit for the fair market rental value of the property
during the time the Breuer-Harrison had possession of the
property?
5.

What was the measure and what was the fair market

rental value of the property during the time the Plaintiffs
Breuer-Harrison had possession of the property?
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
There are no determinative statutes, however, BreuerHarrison rely upon Section 57-1-12 of the Utah Code Annotated
(1953) as amended.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
References
references

to

to
the

the

record

trial

will

transcript

be
(R

designated
1405)

will

R,
be

designated T.
REAL ESTATE CONTRACT
1.

Keith and Philip Combe obtained, by gift, a parcel

of property located across the street from the family home.
(T 196, 212.)
County

Prior to the gift of the property, the Weber

Conservancy

District

by

condemnation

proceedings,

obtained a 3 0 foot wide easement and placed a large aqueduct
underground within the confines of the easement.

At trial,

Keith Combe admitted knowledge of the acqueduct, which was
installed either while Keith resided with his parents or
while he visited them on a weekly basis.
2.

(T 212-213.)

Keith and Philip Combe agreed to convey fee simple

unencumbered

title of the property to Breuer-Harrison by
4

to

be

tried

between

Breuer-Harrison

"equitable" issue of the refund due.
trial, the trial court concluded:

and

Combes was the

During the course of

there was no real issue to

be presented to the jury; the jury was advisory only; BreuerHarrison were entitled to a directed verdict; and BreuerHarrison were entitled to a refund of all payments made to
Combes

under

the

Real

Estate

Contract,

together

with

interest; and Combes were entitled to a credit for the fair
market rental value of the property during the time BreuerHarrison retained possession under the terms of the Real
Estate Contract.
A STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Whether

the

Defendants

Keith

Combe, and

Philip

Combe were unable to convey fee simple unencumbered title to
the Plaintiffs Breuer-Harrison?
2.

Whether the Combes1 inability to convey fee simple

unencumbered

title

to

Breuer-Harrison

constituted

an

anticipatory breach of the Real Estate Contract?
3.

Whether

Breuer-Harrison

was

entitled

to

a

rescission of the Real Estate Contract as a result of Combes1
anticipatory breach?
4.
the Real

If Breuer-Harrison was entitled to a rescission of
Estate

Contract, what was the refund

to which

Breuer-Harrison was entitled, and did it include a refund of
all payments made to Keith and Philip Combe, together with
interest thereon, and were Keith and Philip Combe entitled to
3

concession

in the Contract for Keith Combe, a new title

report was presented
existence

of

the

by Keith Combe which disclosed

easement.

(See Deposition

the

of William

Harrison, R 191, pg. 30, lines 7-14; and Deposition of Bruce
Nilson, R 1420, pg. 42.)
INITIAL EFFORTS TO DETERMINE EXTENT OF EASEMENT
7.

Upon

being

notified

of

the

existence

of

the

easement Breuer-Harrison began an investigation to determine
the

impact

development

of

the

easement

upon

of the property.

the

economics

(See Deposition

of

the

of Casper

Breuer, R 100, pg. 63, lines 8-13; pg. 64, lines 8-13, and
page 65, lines 1-11.)
BELIEF THAT FAILURE TO DISCLOSE WAS THE FAULT OF THE
TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY
8.
believed

Breuer-Harrison, without seeking advice of counsel,
the

failure

to

disclose

the

existence

of

the

easement and the aqueduct was the result of negligence on the
part of the Defendant attorney Froerer, who prepared the Real
Estate Contract for Combe and who prepared the policy of
title insurance provided by Combe for Breuer-Harrison.

Based

upon this belief, Breuer-Harrison contacted Froerer, and the
title insurance company to determine what they intended to do
to resolve the problem.
R

191, pgs.

30-31,

(See Deposition of William Harrison,
lines

20-25,

and

pages

Deposition of Bruce Nilson, R 1420, pg. 45.)

32-34;

and

Breuer-Harrison

made no direct contact with Keith Combe until the summer of
1984, but believed that Bruce or Duane had.
6

(Deposition of

virtue of a Real Estate Contract dated January 9, 1980.

(R.

1409, exhibit 20)
AN UNDISCLOSED EASEMENT ENCUMBERED THE PROPERTY
3.

When Breuer-Harrison purchased the property, Combes

did not disclose the existence of the 30' wide easement which
traversed the property diagonally in a Northwest direction
and they did not disclose the existence of the aqueduct.
Neither the Real Estate Contract (R 1409, exhibit 20), nor
the policy of title insurance (R 1409 exhibit 26) made any
reference to the easement.
AMENDMENTS TO REAL ESTATE CONTRACT
4.

Subsequent to the date of the Real Estate Contract,

the parties entered into four amendments which extended the
time

of

the

payments

due and/or provided

for

alternate

methods of payment of the balance due on the contract.
of

the

amendments

were

conditioned

upon

certain

Two

events

occurring which did not occur and they did not therefore
become effective.
5.
Real

(R 1409, Exhibit 20)

All but one amendment reaffirmed the underlying

Estate

Contract

and

its contractual

provisions and

contained the following or similar language:
"Except for the above Amendment, all other terms
and conditions of the Real Estate Contract dated
December 29, 1979 shall remain the same and in full
force and effect."
EXISTENCE OF EASEMENT DISCLOSED
6.

More

than

three

years

after

the

Real

Estate

Contract was executed, while in the process of negotiating a
5

execution of the Real Estate Contract.

(See Deposition of

Harrison, R 191, pgs. 31-33, and page 42, lines 18-25.)
During the settlement negotiations, Keith Combe indicated
that he didn't want to reduce the purchase price of the
property to reflect its diminished value with the easement in
place.

(T 219)

KNOWLEDGE THAT KEITH COMBE MAY HAVE KNOWN OF THE
EASEMENT
12.

Breuer-Harrison did not know before the summer of

1984, that Keith Combe may have known of the existence of the
easement prior to the time that he entered into the Real
Estate Contract.
lines 10-22.)

(See Deposition of Harrison, R 191, pg. 11,

This action was filed in September of 1984,

approximately one month after the disclosure of Keith Combe
that he may have known of the existence of the aqueduct.
THE PLAT MAP GIVEN TO BREUER-HARRISON
DISCLOSE THE EXISTENCE OF THE EASEMENT.
13.

DID NOT

Prior to the execution of the Real Estate Contract,

Breuer-Harrison

made

a

brief

visit

to

the

property

(Deposition of Breuer, R 100, pgs. 11-13) and made a short
visit to Great Basin Engineering to determine how many lots
could

be

placed

upon

the

parcel

of property

they

were

considering purchasing.
14.

During

Engineering,

the

their

short

engineer

visit

drew

a

with

Great

free

hand

Basin
sketch

demonstrating the approximate number of lots which could be
placed upon the property.

The free hand sketch (which had
8

Breuer, R 100, pg. 55, lines 11-16.)
KNOWLEDGE OF DAMAGE CAUSED BY EASEMENT
9.

As

a

result

of

information

being

received

in

several successive steps, Breuer-Harrison became aware just
shortly before they filed this action that the easement and
the aqueduct prevent them from developing the property in an
economically feasible manner.
was

acquired

after

the

Some of the final information

filing

of

this

action.

(See

Deposition of Harrison, R 191, pg. 37, lines 14-20; and Bruce
Nilson R 1420, pg. 65.)
10.

It is quite clear, however, that the extent of the

damage caused by the easement (the width of the right of way,
the conditions surrounding the right of way, the actual depth
of the aqueduct and the additional problems created thereby)
was not known by Plaintiffs until much later than February
26, 1984.

(See Deposition of Breuer, R 100, pgs. 52-56; and

Deposition of Harrison, R 191, pg. 37, lines 14-20).
SETTLEMENT NEGOTIATIONS
11.

Preliminary

settlement

discussions

took

place

between the parties during the period following the discovery
of the existence of the easement
initial

investigations

revealed

(early 1983) ; and after
the

potential

for

a

significant impact upon the economics of the development of
the property

(late

1983

or early

1984) ; and up to and

including the date the Plaintiffs discovered Keith Combe may
have known of the existence of the Easement prior to the
7

18.

Combes were unable to get Jay Anderson to testify

that he told Breuer-Harrison of the existence of the pipeline
or the easement prior to their purchase of the property.
(Deposition of Anderson, R 1415, pg. 25, lines 11-20).
PRIOR TO THE EXECUTION OF THE REAL ESTATE CONTRACT,
GREAT BASIN ENGINEERING EVALUATED THE SURFACE CONDITIONS OF
THE PROPERTY.
19.

Great

Basin

Engineering

was

engaged

by

Breuer-

Harrison to evaluate the surface physical characteristics of
the property, to see whether the water table and topographic
conditions might

impede its development.

(Deposition of

Anderson, R 1415, pg. 29-30, lines 24-25 and 1-6.)
20.

Great Basin drew upon their prior knowledge of the

storm water runoff;

analyzed the soil types,

(Deposition of

Anderson, R 1415, pgs. 3 3-35); and reviewed the physical
placement of Skyline Drive.

(Deposition of Anderson, R 1415,

pg. 37, lines 21-25 and pg. 38.)
GREAT BASIN ENGINEERING WAS SHOWN THE TITLE REPORT
DISCLOSING THE EXISTENCE OF THE EASEMENT FOR THE FIRST TIME
IN 1983.
21.

Great

Basin

Engineering

saw

the

title

report

disclosing the existence of the easement for the first time
in

1983, more

than three years after they examined

the

physical conditions of the surface of the real property.
(Deposition of Anderson, R 1415, pg. 51, lines 6-22).
22.

Upon obtaining a copy of the title report, Great

Basin Engineering obtained a copy of the actual easement from
Weber Basin,

(Deposition of Anderson, R 1415, pg. 56, lines
10

been copied in blue and was given to Breuer-Harrison) did not
disclose

the easement.

The pipeline, as

property

to be purchased,

was either

it crossed

not visible

the

on the

blueprint, or was so obscured that it was impossible to see.
(Deposition of Jay Anderson, R 1415, pg. 79, lines 12-14).
15.

The Plat Maps created after the purchase of the

property did not demonstrate the easement and did not clearly
demonstrate the existence of the pipeline over the property.
(Deposition of Jay Anderson, R 1415, pgs. 45, lines 18-25 and
pg. 46, lines 1-7).
16.

The first Plat Map actually created by Great Basin

Engineering
purchase

came

of

the

into

existence

property.

It

several

months

virtually

after the

obscured

the

existence of the pipeline over the subdivision; was not given
to Breuer-Harrison; but instead was presented to the engineer
for the county and for the City of Ogden.
Anderson, R 1415, pg. 46, lines 8-12.)
even recall
Keil.

(Deposition of Jay

Jay Anderson doesn't

if a copy of the Plat Map was given to Steve

(Deposition of Anderson, R 1415, pg. 47, lines 1-15.)

COMBES FAIL TO RECOGNIZE THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN AN
EASEMENT AND A PIPELINE.
17.
failed

During
to

"pipeline"

pretrial

understand
and

the term

discovery,

the

difference

"easement".

Combes

consistently

between

the

(Deposition

term

of Jay

Anderson, R 1415, pg. 71, lines 16-20.)
THERE IS NO RECORD THAT ESTABLISHES THAT
ANDERSON TOLD BREUER-HARRISON OF THE EXISTENCE OF
PIPELINE, MUCH LESS THE EXISTENCE OF THE EASEMENT.
9

JAY
THE

the

developer

and/or

owner

of the property

making

them

responsible for repairs to the aqueduct, basically requiring
them to become insurers.

(Deposition of Anderson, R 1415,

pg. 67, lines 17-25, pg. 68, lines 1-22.)
26.

The existence of the easement would require the

developer to put in an additional sewer line running down the
back of the lot lines of the project housing development.
(Deposition of Anderson, R 1415, pg. 102, lines 18-25.)
27.

The existence of the easement made fifteen feet of

the property on either side of the aqueduct "essentially
unusable for anything except vegetation."

(Deposition of

Anderson, R 1415, pg. 83, lines 6-12.)
28.

The

easement

required

special

bridging

or

a

concrete cover to be placed over any portion of the aqueduct
that "sits within a street."

(Deposition of Anderson, R

1415, pg. 83, lines 20-25; pg. 84, lines 1-3.)
JAY ANDERSON COULD NOT RECALL ANY SPECIFIC
CONVERSATIONS WITH STEVEN KEIL IN WHICH HE TALKED ABOUT THE
EXISTENCE OF THE PIPELINE.
29.

Jay Anderson could not recall telling Steve Keil

about of the existence of the pipeline (not the easement) in
1979.

Jay Anderson testified as follows.

"Q. But I'm asking you now, can you recall
any specific conversation with Steve Keil about the
pipeline, other than your assumption that there had
been conversation; can you recall any specific
conversation?
A.

No, I canft."

(Deposition of Anderson, R 1415, pg. 94, lines 21-25.)
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21-25

and

pg.

information
created.

57,

concerning

line

1.); and

the easement

obtained
and

additional

the problems

it

(Deposition of Anderson, R 1415, pg. 57, lines 9-

16.)
23.
existence

Great
of

development

Basin

the

30

Engineering
foot

did

easement

of the property

not

and

in the years

know

its

of

the

impact upon

1979-80.

Jay

Anderson testified as follows:
"Q. Now, if you would have known of the
existence of this 30-foot easement and all of these
conditions and restrictions in 1979, would you have
shown that easement and those restrictions or
indications on the plan as to that easement or
whatever impact it may have had on development?
A.
We would have shown the width of the
easement. And instead of running a road over the
easement, we would have probably tried to run back
lot lines on it to limit the amount of impact on
it." (Deposition of Anderson, R 1415, pg. 84, line
25; pg. 85, lines 1-8.)
THE EXISTENCE OF THE EASEMENT CREATED AN ALMOST
INSURMOUNTABLE BARRIER TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PROPERTY.
24.

Jay Anderson testified that the existence of the

easement prohibited the placement of houses over the easement
and created special problems if the developer wanted to cross
the easement with utilities.

(Deposition of Anderson, R

1415, pg. 41, lines 1-9.)
25.

The existence of the easement and the pipeline,

made the approval process of digging around the pipeline
almost insurmountable, placed enormous restrictions on the
backfill

over

the

pipeline,

placed

restrictions

on

the

laterals for utilities, and placed the financial burden on
11

disagreement with every statement in Combes1 Statement of
Facts as contained

in its brief since many of them are

refuted by Breuer-Harrison's Statement of Facts, however, it
is significant to note that several statements made by Combes
are incorrect and misleading.
1.

Combe brief, pg 7, para. 5.

Breuer-Harrison had

not been involved in large scale residential projects. Note,
William Harrison was a native of Salt Lake, not a large scale
California developer.
2.
sheet"

Combe brief, pg 9, para. 10.
was

never

given

to

The so-called "base

Breuer-Harrison.

All

the

subdivision layouts did not show the pipeline and its 3 0 foot
easement.

The reduced copy attached to Combe's brief and

designated as Exhibit "A" was not the sketch given to BreuerHarrison during their visit to Great Basin Engineering.

The

sketch given to Breuer-Harrison was marked as Exhibit 3 to
the Deposition of Anderson (R 1422).
3.

Combe

brief,

pg.

17, para.

31.

This

entire

statement is inacurrate and is not supported by the record
cited.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1.

At the time the Summary Judgment was granted to

Breuer-Harrison, there was no admissible evidence which would
demonstrate

that

Breuer-Harrison

had

knowledge

of

the

easement prior to the execution of the Real Estate Contract.
2.

Keith

and

Philip

Combe
14

could

not

convey

HAD GREAT BASIN ENGINEERING KNOWN OF THE WIDTH OF
THE EASEMENT AND THE SPECIAL RESTRICTIONS ON THE EASEMENT,
THEY WOULD HAVE ADVISED THE PURCHASERS NOT TO PURCHASE THE
PROPERTY.
30.

Jay Anderson testified as follows:

"Q. Now, if you had known when you met with .
. . Steve Keil in 1979 of a 3 0-foot easement and
the restrictions that apply that you discovered
later in '83 were being rigorously enforced, would
you have given him any special warnings in relation
to this particular easement over and above those
which you think you would have standardly given him
as a result of a pipeline?
A.
Oh, naturally would have given him,
suggested it was a really difficult piece of
property to develop with those kind of restrictions
on it, that cost would be higher than normal to
develop the lots because of it.
Q.
Anything else you can think of you would
have told him?
A.
Look
probably. . ."

for

another

piece

of

ground,

(Deposition of Anderson, R 1415, pg. 98, lines 19-25, pg. 99,
lines 1-8.)
THE FIRST TIME THE EASEMENT WAS DRAWN BY GREAT
BASIN ENGINEERING ON ANY PLATS. WAS AFTER THE DISCLOSURE OF
THE EASEMENT IN THE TITLE REPORT DELIVERED BY COMBE TO BRUCE
NILSON IN 1983.
31.

The

first

drawings prepared

time

the

easement was

shown

on the

by Great Basin, was after Keith Combe

disclosed the existence of the easement in the title report
and the title report was delivered by Bruce Nilson to Great
Basin in 1983.

(Deposition of Anderson, R 1415, pg. 103,

lines 19-25, pg. 104, lines 1-15.)
DISAGREEMENT WITH COMBES STATEMENT OF FACTS
Breuer-Harrison will not take the time to set forth its
13

6.

Upon rescision of the Real Estate Contract, Breuer-

Harrison was entitled to a refund of all money paid to and/or
on behalf of the Combes, together with interest thereon, less
the fair market rental value of the property.
7.

The fair market rental value of the property was to

be determined by competant evidence from experts who could
form an opinion as to the market value of the property, but
could not be based upon speculative theories as to the profit
or fair rate of return expected from a profitable venture.
Breuer-Harrison provided such testimony.

Combes relied upon

inadmissible opinions of speculative profits to be obtained
from a financial venture, the profitability of which could
not be established.
8.

Combes 1

brief

ignored

the

controlling

and

applicable case law as set forth by the Utah Supreme Court,
and

instead

relied

upon

generic

statements

taken

from

divorce, foreclosure and other inapplicable cases which are
easily distinguishable.
9.

Combes have appealed for equity to be done, yet

they want to have their cake and eat it too.

They would urge

that they should be entitled to take the property back, which
they have done, and

also keep all the payments made by

Breuer-Harrison.
10.

Combes assertion that the bifurcation of the trial

was prejudicial to Combes is not well taken.

In fact, if the

bifurcation had not taken place, it would have been extremely
16

unencumbered, fee title to the property to Breuer-Harrison as
required by the Real Estate Contract and were therefore
guilty of an anticipatory breach of the contract.
3.

When Breuer-Harrison discovered that the vendors

Combes could not deliver unencumbered fee simple title and
that

an

undisclosed

easement

severly

impacted

upon

the

property, they had the right to determine if, and when they
would make an election to rescind the contract.

Until they

made such an election, there could be no waiver of their
right to rescind.
4.

When the vendees Breuer-Harrison elected to claim

an anticipatory

breach, they were entitled

to a summary

judgment rescinding the contract for the reason that Combes
could not convey unencumbered fee simple title as required by
the contract.
5.

Breuer-Harrison did not know of the easement when

they executed the Real Estate Contract, but even if they had,
under Utah

Law they had the right to expect fee simple

unencumbered title as required by the Real Estate Contract.
There

is

a

difference

between

executory

and

executed

contracts, and a vendor does not have to be able to convey
fee title when the real estate contract is executed, only
when

the

vendor's

performance

is

required.

Therefore

knowledge of a deficiency of title by a vendee prior to the
required performance of the vendor does not bar the right of
the vendee to require such performance when due.
15

POINT NO. 2
THE DEFENDANTS WERE GUILTY OF AN
ANTICIPATORY BREACH OF THE REAL ESTATE
CONTRACT AND PLAINTIFFS WERE RELIEVED OF
THE RESPONSIBILITY OF FURTHER PERFORMANCE
UNDER THE TERMS OF THE REAL ESTATE
CONTRACT.
An anticipatory breach of contract is committed when a
party to a contract either cannot or will not perform at the
time such performance is required by the contract.

17 Am.

Jur. 2d, Contracts §448.
When

there

has

been

an

anticipatory

breach

of

a

contract, the other party may treat the entire contract as
though it had been breached.

17 Am. Jur. 2d, Contracts §448.

It is not necessary for the party not in breach to make a
tender of performance.

The party not in breach may either

treat the contract as binding and wait for the time of actual
breach, or may rescind the contract and sue for money paid.
17 Am. Jur. 2d, Contracts §449.
In University Club v. Invesco Holding Corporation, 29
Utah

2d

1, 504, P.2d

29

(1972), the Utah Supreme Court

stated:
" . . . The recognized rule is that where one party
definitely indicates that he cannot or will not
perform a condition of a contract, the other is not
required to uselessly abide time, but may act upon
the breached condition.
Indeed in appropriate
circumstances he ought to do so to mitigate
damages."
(Id. at 30.)
The doctrine of Anticipatory Breach is applicable in the
case at hand.

The Defendants Combes were unable to perform
18

prejudicial to Breuer-Harrison.

Combes had no standing to

participate in the issues which were bifurcated and reserved
for later determination•
ARGUMENT
POINT NO. 1
COMBES PRESENTED NO COMPETENT ADMISSIBLE
EVIDENCE AT THE TIME OF THE HEARING OF
THE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO
DEMONSTRATE THAT BREUER-HARRISON KNEW OF
THE EXISTENCE OF THE EASEMENT PRIOR TO
THE EXECUTION OF THE REAL ESTATE
CONTRACT.
Although Combes made every attempt to obtain admissible
evidence

to

establish

that

Breuer-Harrison

knew

of

the

existence of the easement prior to the execution of the Real
Estate Contract in December of 1979, they were unsuccessful.
The testimony of Jay Anderson of Great Basin made it clear
that had he known of the existence of the easement and its
complications in 1979, he would have advised Breuer-Harrison
to find another piece of property.

To the contrary, Combes

knew or should have known of the existence of the easement,
but did not disclose its existence.
At the time of the Motion for Summary Judgment, it was
clear that no plat map created by Great Basin prior to the
year

1983

disclosed

the

existence

of

the

easement.

Furthermore, it was clear that the pipeline was not visible
on the free hand sketch (blueprint) plat map given to BreuerHarrison prior to the execution of the Real Estate Contract.

17

for damages; (3) to sue at once for damages.

17A C.J.S.

Contracts §472.
The inability of the breaching party to perform the
contract constitutes grounds for rescission of the contract
if the performance anticipated is essentially different from
the performance promised.

17 Am. Jur. 2d, Contracts §506.

In Marlowe Investment Corporation v. Radmall, 26 Utah 2d
124, 485 P.2d 1402 (1971), the Utah Supreme Court held:
" . . . Nevertheless, if it plainly appears that he
[the vendor] has so lost or encumbered his
ownership or his title that he will not be able to
fulfill his contract, he cannot insist that the
purchaser continue to make payments when it is
obvious that his own performance will not be
forthcoming. . ."
(Id. at 1404.)
In Hurwitz v. David K. Richards & Company, 20 Utah 2d
232, 436 P.2d 794 (1968), the Utah Supreme Court recognized
the common law rule that if there is an anticipatory breach,
the non-breaching party has three options available:

one, to

treat the entire contract as breached and sue for damages;
two, to treat the contract as binding and wait until the time
for performance and then bring action on the contract; and
three, to rescind the contract and sue for money paid.

The

Utah Supreme Court quoted from 17 Am. Jur. 2d Contracts §4 51
which indicates that the anticipatory breach is kept open
until the injured party elects to treat the contract as
breached and brings action.
In the case at hand, Breuer-Harrison was excused from
20

their obligations under the contract to convey fee simple,
unencumbered

title

to

Plaintiffs.

The

Plaintiffs

were

entitled to maintain this action and were entitled to a
determination

that

the

Defendants

were

guilty

of

an

anticipatory breach of the Contract.
POINT NO. 3
THE PLAINTIFFS HAD THE OPTION OF
DETERMINING WHEN THEY WOULD MAKE THE
ELECTION OF ANTICIPATORY BREACH OF
CONTRACT. UNTIL THE PLAINTIFFS MADE THE
ELECTION, THERE COULD BE NO WAIVER BY THE
PLAINTIFFS.
When

the

injured

party

discovers

the

anticipatory

breach, the injured party has the right to make an election
as to whether he will treat the contract as breached before
the

time

performance

is

due

or

to

performance is due under the contract.

wait

until

actual

17 Am. Jur. 2d,

Contracts §449.
There is no breach until the anticipatory breach is
recognized by the injured party, and there is no particular
time during which the injured party must make his election to
take advantage of the breach.

17 Am. Jur. 2d, Contracts

§456.
Where there is an anticipatory breach of the contract,
the injured party is excused from performance.

17 Am. Jur.

2d, Contracts §428.
When there is an anticipatory breach, the injured party
has the right to pursue three remedies, i.e. (1) to rescind
the contracts; (2) to treat the contract as binding and sue
19

CJS Vendor & Purchaser §161(3).
The mere fact that Combes and First Security Bank as
trustee for Philip Combe could not convey a fee simple,
unencumbered title did not excuse them from their obligation
to perform.

92 CJS Vendor & Purchaser §229, and §229(c)(3).

Their inability to perform did not prevent Breuer-Harrison
from obtaining a rescission of the contract.

92 CJS Vendor &

Purchaser §165.
The deed to which Breuer-Harrison was entitled was one
which

conveyed

easement.

the

fee

title

to

the

land

92 CJS Vendor & Purchaser §203.

without

the

Combes' argument

that Paragraph 5 of the Real Estate Contract concerning the
physical condition of the land excuses Combes from complying
with the express provisions of Paragraph 8 of the Real Estate
Contract concerning title is not well taken.
An encumbrance is any adverse right or privilege which
interferes with the full right and use of the land.
Vendor & Purchaser §235 (a) .

92 CJS

An easement is an encumbrance

and constitutes a defect in the title.

See Marlow Investment

Corporation v. Radmall. 26 Utah 2d 124, 485 P.2d 1402 (1971);
and Stewart Livestock Co. v. Ostler, 105 Utah 529, 144 P. 2d
276 (1943).
In Stewart Livestock Co. v. Ostler, 105 Utah 529, 144
P.2d 276 (Utah 1943), the Utah Supreme Court held:
11

. . . The vendee is entitled to the very
consideration for which he bargained and gave
value—good title to the land, where the agreement
is to convey title by warranty deed without
22

further payments when it was determined that Combes could not
deliver the title they contracted to convey, at a future
specified date.

It is to their credit that Breuer-Harrison

made reasonable efforts to mitigate the potential loss and
attempted to see if they could overcome the easement by
creative engineering.

Breuer-Harrison expended thousands of

reimbursed dollars for engineering evaluations and drawings
in an effort to mitigate the loss.

When Breuer-Harrison

determined that the additional engineering costs to overcome
the effects of the easement would exceed $150,000.00 they
concluded

that

they

could

not

develop

the

property

economically.
Since there can be no waiver of a right of action until
it

arises,

and

since

no

right

of

action

arose

until

Plaintiffs elected to treat the anticipatory breach as a
breach of the contract and coinmenced legal action, there
could be no waiver of that breach until after the election
was made by Plaintiffs.
POINT NO. 4
PLAINTIFFS WERE ENTITLED TO A SUMMARY
JUDGMENT OF RESCISSION OF THE REAL ESTATE
CONTRACT.
A

purchaser

defective title.

of

property

is not

bound

to

92 CJS Vendor & Purchaser §221.

accept a
If the

vendors (Combes and First Security Bank) could not convey a
title free and clear of encumbrances, the purchasers (BreuerHarrison) were entitled to a rescission of the contract.
21

91

contract was amended twice by the parties.

The vendee went

into possession at the time of the contract and remained in
possession.

The vendee went into default and failed to make

the payments due.

The Utah Supreme Court stated:

". . . Under a land contract calling for deferred
payments and delivery of the deed at the time of
the final payment, marketable title in vendor at
the time he is required to deliver the deed is
sufficient, the provisions in the contract
expressly calling for earlier perfecting of title
having been waived. . ."
(Id. at 143.)
In Castaano v. Church, 552 P. 2d 1282 (Utah 1976), the
Utah Supreme Court held that where the vendor could not
provide the water rights contemplated under the real estate
contract, the rule applicable is as follows:
11

. . . The rule has been long established that a
vendee has the right to insist upon performance by
the vendor to the extent the latter is able to
perform with an abatement in the purchase price
equal to the value of the deficiency or defect.11
(Id. at 1284.)
Under Utah Law, if Breuer and Harrison had demanded
specific performance of the contract, they would have been
entitled to a deduction in the purchase price in an amount
equal to the reduced market value of the property as a result
of the easement.

24

qualifications•"
fid, at 2810
It is clear under the common law and the Utah law as
expressed by the Utah Supreme Court that Plaintiffs were not
required to accept less than fee simple, unencumbered title
from Combes.

No matter how you view the situation, the

Combes were guilty of an anticipatory breach of the contract
and could not convey fee simple, unencumbered title.

The

breach of the contract goes to the essence of the contract in
that the value of the property was so substantially damaged
by the existence of the easement, that Breuer-Harrison could
not receive the property which they contracted to receive.
Where

the

essence

of

the

bargain

was

so

substantially

destroyed, the Plaintiffs were entitled to a rescission of
the contract.
Had Breuer-Harrison elected to enforce the Real Estate
Contract and sue for damages, their damages would have been
the difference between the contract price and the fair market
value of the property with the easement.
In Bitzes v. Sunset Oaks, Inc., 649 P.2d 66 (Utah 1982),
the Utah Supreme Court stated:
". . . If this were a real estate contract, the
usual measure of damage would be the appellant's
benefit of the bargain with reference to the
contract price and the market value of the property
at the time of the breach. . ."
(Id. at 71).
In Navlor v. Jolley, 100 Utah 130, 111 P.2d 142 (1941),
the Utah Supreme Court reviewed a case in which a real estate
23

be determined at trial.
B.
KNOWLEDGE OF THE EXISTENCE OF THE EASEMENT IS NOT A
DEFENSE IN A CLAIM FOR ANTICIPATORY BREACH OF CONTRACT TO
CONVEY FEE SIMPLE UNENCUMBERED TITLE.
If you assume, for purpose of argument, that BreuerHarrison knew of the existence of the easement or had such
knowledge as to put them on a duty of inquiry as to the
easement, they made such, by requiring a title search and a
policy of title insurance which the Defendants provided, and
in which it was represented and warranted that there were no
easements on the property.

Pursuant to the representations

and warranties contained in the Real Estate Contract, and the
representations

and warranties

contained

in the policy

of

title insurance, Breuer-Harrison purchased the property and
continued to make payments thereon.
Waiver
require

is not a defense to the claim of a vendee to

the vendor to

comply with

the terms

of the

real

estate contract and convey fee simple, unencumbered title to
the property.

See Marlowe Investment Corporation v. Radmall.

26 Utah 2d 124, 485 P.2d
Richards

1402

(1971); Hurwitz v. David K.

& Company, 20 Utah 2d 232, 436 P.2d

794

(1968);

Stewart Livestock Co. v. Ostler, 105 Utah 529, 144 P. 2d 276
(1943); Navlor v. Jollev, 100 Utah 130, 111 P.2d 142 (1941);
Castaano v. Church, 552 P.2d
Woodruff,
Condon,

23
27

Utah
Utah

494,
473,

65
76

1282
Pac.

Pac.

(Utah 1976); Leonard v.
199

343

Fitzgerald, 671 P.2d 224 (Utah 1983)
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(1901);
(1904);

Glassman
and

Hall

v.
v.

POINT NO. 5
PLAINTIFFS1 DID NOT KNOW OF THE EASEMENT
AT THE TIME OF THE PURCHASE OF THE
PROPERTY, BUT EVEN IF THEY HAD, SUCH
KNOWLEDGE WOULD NOT HAVE BARRED THIS
ACTION.
A,.

EXECUTORY CONTRACTS V. EXECUTED CONTRACTS.

An executory real estate contract is an agreement which
is not fully performed by the parties to the agreement and in
which title has not been conveyed to the buyers.
contrary,

a

agreement

fully
in

performed

which

the

real

parties

To the

estate

contract

is an

have

performed

their

obligations under the contract, have conveyed title, and have
either no

further obligations, or have issued negotiable

instruments which create new causes of action.
The doctrine of anticipatory breach is applicable only
in the case of executory contracts in which title has not
been conveyed and would not apply to those contracts which
have

been

conveyed.

fully

performed

and

in which

title has been

By the same token, the doctrine of waiver of the

breach is not applicable in claims of anticipatory breach
because

until

the

damaged

party

elects

to

treat

the

anticipatory breach as a breach, there can be no waiver.
On the other hand, where the contract has been fully
performed, and title has been conveyed, the failure of the
injured

party

to

act

in

a

timely

manner,

after

full

performance, and after discovery of fraud may constitute a
waiver and the issue of waiver is usually an issue of fact to
25

outstanding encumbrances, and that he agreed to
take only the title which the vendor then had,
where such facts depends upon extrinsic evidence,
and are contradictory of the express terms of the
contract entered into between the parties.1111
fid, at 140.)
In Leonard v. Woodruff, 23 Utah 494, 65 Pac. 199 (1901),
the Utah Supreme Court reiterated the general rule of law as
follows:
"Generally, the vendor, in the absence of an
agreement. . . is required, as a condition
precedent to the bringing or maintaining an action
for specific performance to tender to the vendee a
conveyance of a good marketable title to the whole
property contracted for . . . "
fid, at 203.)
In

Leonard,

the

contract

for the

exchange

of real

property did not provide an express warranty of marketable
title.

The Utah Supreme Court held that no implied warranty

of marketable title would be imposed upon the vendor where
squatters occupied a small corner of the property, and the
vendee

had

express

knowledge

of

the

squatters

on

the

property, and a deed was prepared and the vendee did not
object to the form of the deed when it was presented to the
vendee.
The Leonard case was later cited by the Utah Supreme
Court in Glassman v. Condon, 27 Utah 463, 76 Pac. 343 (1904).
In

Glassman,

the

Utah

Supreme

Court

indicated

that the

Leonard case was to be narrowly construed and was applicable
only where it was determined by the trial court, as a matter
of fact, that the parties had agreed that the vendor would be
28

In Glassman v. Condon, 27 Utah 473, 76 Pac. 343 (1904),
the Utah Supreme Court specifically rejected an argument that
the buyer's prior knowledge of an outstanding mortgage barred
buyer from requiring a fee simple title to be conveyed upon
payment of the contract price.

In specific, the Utah Supreme

Court stated:
" . . . The respondent contracted to furnish a
good title, and the fact that he was unable to do
so is his misfortune, and not the fault of the
appellant."
(Id. at 345.)
Not only did Glassman require conveyance of fee simple
title free and clear of the encumbrance, it also stated that
the effect of a warranty deed is to require fee simple title
with covenants from the grantor.

This decision is in accord

with the Utah Code Ann. Section 57-1-12 which specifically
requires a warranty deed to have the effect of a conveyance
in

fee

simple,

with

warranties,

free

and

clear

of

encumbrances.
In Simpson v. Stallincrs. 225 P.2d 139 (N.M. 1950), the
New Mexico Supreme Court quoting from 57 A.L.R. 1253, at
1541,

set

forth the

following common

law rule regarding

knowledge of defects at the time of the purchase of real
property:
»»* * * [T]he general rule is that knowledge by the
vendee of the vendor's lack of title at the time he
entered into the contract is immaterial, since he
has a right to rely upon the vendor either having a
title, or procuring it so as to carry out his
agreement. It is no defense for the vendor to show
that the vendee knew of the existence of
27

disallowance of interest. . . "
(Id, at 1150)
This general statement of the common law is the rule of
law adopted by the Utah Supreme Court and reiterated on
several occasions.
In Hurwitz v. David K. Richards & Company, 20 Utah 2d
232, 436 P.2d 797 (1968), The Utah Supreme Court restated the
general

rule

concerning

rescission

arising

out

of

the

anticipatory breach of a contract to sell real estate.

The

court stated:
"If there had been an anticipatory breach,
Richards had three options available to him:
1. Treat the entire contract as broken
and sue for damages.
2.
Treat the contract as still binding and
wait until the time arrived for its performance and
at such time bring an action on the contract.
3.
Rescind the contract and sue for money
paid or for the value of the services of property
furnished."
(Id, at 796.)
In Mecham v. Benson, 590 P.2d 304 (Utah 1979), the Utah
Supreme Court reviewed a case involving the rescission of a
contract for the sale of a mobile home.

The Jury awarded the

purchaser the return of his down payment.

The Utah Supreme

Court stated:
"The return to buyers of their down payment
after justifiable rescission is consistent with
long precedent."
(Id. at 308.)
In Jacobson v. Swan, 3 Utah 2d 59, 278 P.2d 294 (1954),
30

permitted to convey less than a fee simple, unencumbered
title.
In Glassman. the Utah Supreme Court stated:
11

. . . It is an elementary principle of law that
every purchaser of real property has a right to
demand a title free from incumbrance and defects.
And the great weight of authority holds that the
legal affect of contracts to furnish a good title
or a warranty deed, under a contract of purchase,
is that the vendor, before he can compel payment of
the purchase price, or any part thereof, must make
and tender a title free from incumbrance and
unclouded. . . unless the contract by its terms, or
the circumstances leading up to and surrounding the
transaction, show the parties intended that the
sale and transfer of the property should be made
subject to the defects, if any, in the title. . ."
(Id. at 344.)
The Glassman case is recognized as precedent and is
cited in Hall v. Fitzgerald. 671 P.2d 224 (Utah 1983) in
which reference is made to the foregoing quotation.
POINT NO. 6
THE PLAINTIFFS WERE ENTITLED TO A REFUND
FROM THE DEFENDANTS COMBES IN AN AMOUNT
EQUAL TO THE PAYMENTS MADE TO OR ON
BEHALF OF THE COMBES, LESS THE FAIR
MARKET RENTAL VALUE OF THE PROPERTY
DURING THE APPLICABLE PERIOD.
In 91 C.J.S. Vendor & Purchaser Section 178, the general
rule of law regarding a purchaser's right to a refund of
money paid on a rescinded contract is as follows:
"On rescission by the purchaser for causes
authorizing a rescission, he is entitled to be
restored to the position he was in at the time of
the execution of the contract. Accordingly, he is
entitled to a restoration of the purchase money and
to interest thereon from the time of payment, even
in the absence of prayer for restoration, unless
there is some equity in the case which requires a
29

the claim of rescission did not arise, except as an after
thought, and the court concluded

that the purchaser had

really

The Utah

abandoned

the

contract.

Supreme

Court

stated:
". . . The effect of her conduct appears
have been to treat the contract as abandoned.
should be so regarded and she should not
permitted to "resurrect" and assert such a claim
this suit."

to
It
be
in

fid, at 194.)
Other courts have followed the same rule of law adopted
by the Utah Supreme Court.

In the following cases from other

jurisdictions, certain issues not treated in the Utah Supreme
Court opinions are resolved in favor of the Plaintiffs.
In Matanuska Valley Bank v. Abernathy, 445 P.2d

235

(Alaska 1968), the Alaska Supreme Court found that because of
an

easement

rescission

not
of

disclosed,

the

contract

the

vendee

and

that

was

the

entitled

purchaser

to
was

entitled to a refund and payment of the following:
"Since recision (sic) was ordered because of
the inability of the Bank to convey a beneficial
title to a substantial portion of the property,
Abernathy was entitled to a return of all of the
money paid on the purchase price, including
interest and of any amount expended in payment of
taxes, plus interest on said sums.
In addition,
Abernathy was entitled to reimbursement for monies
expended for permanent improvements made to the
property and for monies expended to provide fire
insurance coverage on the buildings. The Bank is
entitled to the fair rental value of the property
for such period of time as is appropriately
chargeable against Abernathy."
(Id. at 239.)
In addition see Miller v. Sears, 636 P. 2d 1183 (Alaska
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the Utah Supreme Court restated the general rule concerning
rescission of a real estate contract.

The Utah Supreme Court

said:
" . . . Where a contract for the sale of land
is rescinded by mutual agreement with no express
agreement as to the damages to the seller or the
return of the purchase money paid, the purchaser is
entitled to recover the money paid on the purchase
price less the reasonable rental value of the
property which he has occupied.
Here we have
either a mutual rescission of the contract of
purchase, or plaintiffs terminated defendants1
rights under the contract on account of their
failure to live up to one or all of these
agreements.
Under either of those situations
defendants are entitled to an accounting for this
sum of money, for . . . there was no express
agreement in either of the leases to the effect
that defendants should not recover this money paid
under the contract of sale. . . . "
(Id. at 299.)
In Leavitt v. Blohm, 11 Utah 2d 220, 357 P.2d

190

(1960), the Utah Supreme Court restated the general rule
regarding rescission of real estate contracts as follows:
11

. . . Under usual circumstances we would
agree with the trial court's view that the parties
should be restored to status quo by charging Mrs.
Blohm with the reasonable rental value of the
property during her occupancy, crediting her with
payments she had made, and giving her judgment for
the difference on her counterclaim.
But a court
should not so decree where it appears unfair and
inequitable to do so."
fid, at 193.)
It should be noted

that the unfair and

inequitable

reason why the refund should not have been made in Leavitt
was that the original payment was a trade of property, which
was apparently not worth the recited $5,000 and furthermore,
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Heiskanen had been an appraiser in the Ogden area for 14
years, was

an SRA, an SRPA, a candidate member

in the

American Institute of Real Estate Appraisers, had been past
president,

secretary

and

State director

Society of American Appraisers.

of

the American

He taught the upper division

appraising course at Weber State College and had performed
over 5,500 appraisals in the Ogden area.

(T., pgs. 32-34.)

Mr. Heiskanen testified that there are three approaches
in determining the fair market value of property:
direct sales or market approach;

1. the

2. the cost approach, which

cannot be applied to land, only to buildings; and

3. the

income approach, which cannot be readily applied to rental of
undeveloped land.

(T., pgs. 3 6-37.)

Mr. Heiskanen testified that the direct sales or market
approach was the only appropriate method which could be used
in the case at hand.

(T., pg. 37.)

Mr. Heiskanen testified

that, in his opinion, the 19.6 acres of ground, rounded to 2 0
acres would rent for $1,200 a year for 20 years.
38, 40.)

(T. , pgs.

The property had previously been rented for $1,000

a year, or $50.00 an acre.

(T., pg. 39.)

He further

testified that the fair market value of the land would have
little or nothing to do with the fair market rental.

(T.,

pg. 39.)
Combes

called

William

appraiser to testify

L.

Christensen,

in their behalf.

a

Salt

Lake

Mr. Christensen!s

testimony was highly speculative, lacked credible foundation
34

1981) a case

involving

a rescission

of a sale of real

property, in which the Court granted rescission and refused
to charge the buyers with the reasonable rental value of the
property.

The court awarded prejudgment interest to the

buyers on the amounts credited to the buyers.
In Walter v. Moore, 700 P.2d 1219 (Wyo. 1985), a case
involving

a

rescission

of

a

contract

for

sale of real

property,

rescission was granted and the buyer was awarded a

refund of the payments made to the seller, payments made to
repair

the

well

and

the pump

shed, Attorneys

fees and

payments made on the trailer.
In the case at hand, Breuer-Harrison, as vendees, were
entitled to a refund of all payments to Combes and all taxes
paid on the property, together with interest thereon.
POINT NO. 7
THE FAIR MARKET RENTAL VALUE OF THE REAL
PROPERTY HAD TO BE ESTABLISHED BY
COMPETENT EVIDENCE.
During the trial, counsel for Combes and Breuer-Harrison
stipulated

as to the amounts paid by Breuer-Harrison

Combes and in their behalf.

to

The trial court merely accepted

and adopted the stipulation, leaving only one remaining issue
to be tried, namely, the fair market rental value of the
property.
During the trial Breuer-Harrison called two substantial
independent appraisers to testify
rental value of the property.

as to the

fair market

The first appraiser, Allen
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number of lots affected would be limited to two or three
lots;

(T., pg.

286.)

and

admitted

that

he

permitted

portions of his file to be removed before he appeared to
testify.
4.

(T., pg. 287.)
He admitted that in making his assumption that only

two or three lots would be affected by the easement that he
believed that a road could be placed over the easement,
without any special bridging requirements.
300.)

(T., pgs. 289,

He further admitted that if special concrete bridging

requirements were imposed by the easement that it would have
a serious impact upon the property.
5.

(T., pg. 304.)

He further admitted that he made no determination

of the cost of developing the subdivision (T. , pg. 290-291)
and obtained no engineering estimates as to the cost of
developing the subdivision (T., pg. 291) and therefore could
not

testify

as

to

the

economic

development of the subdivision.
8.

of

the

(T., pgs. 304-307)

He did not prepare a written appraisal because

Combe's attorney asked him not to.
9.

feasibility

(T., pg. 292.)

He testified that he assumed the lots could be

developed and sold at a rate of three to five a year at
$22,000

per

lot,

(T., pgs.

292-293.)

but

he made no

calculation of the present worth of the sale of three to five
lots per year at $22,000 a lot, over a period of some 11
years.
10.

(T., pgs. 294-296.)
He

further

admitted
36

that

if

the

costs

of

and failed to address the issue of fair market rental as
follows:
1.

Mr. Christensen declined to testify as to the fair

market rental value of the land in its present state, but
instead

rendered

an opinion that an investment ought to

return nine and a half to 11 percent or 12 percent.
275-276.)

(T., pg.

After refusing to testify as to the fair market

value of the property he then multiplied the so-called fair
market value of the property times the reasonable rate of
return that a person ought to expect from an investment and
concluded that the property should bring a reasonable rate of
return of $49,350 per year for six and a quarter years, or in
other words $308,438.
2.

On

cross

(T., pg. 278.)

examination, Mr. Christensen

admitted:

that he would have to consider the fair rental rate to be
less than $49,350 per year;

(R 1405, pg. 279.)

admitted

that he didnft know how many acres the property included;
(R1405, pg. 280.)

admitted that he didn't know what the cost

would be to develop the land; and admitted he did not know
what the effect of the easement would be because he did not
consult with any engineers concerning the property.

(T., pg.

284.)
3.

He

testified

that

he

assumed,

without

any

engineering input, that the easement would only impact upon
two or three of the lots;

(T., pg. 285.)

and admitted that

he didn't bring any materials with him to verify that the
35

economically
residential

feasible

purposes,

but

to

develop

had

not

the

made

determine if the assumption was correct.

property
an

analysis

for
to

(T. , pgs. 309-

310)
After he had testified that he had failed to make the
necessary

inquiry

as to the economic

feasibility

of the

development of the property for residential purposes, and
that he had assumed it was economically feasible, the trial
court asked Mr. Christensen to define fair market value. Mr.
Christensen then admitted that fair market value would be the
probable sale price which would occur
"when two people negotiate neither being under
pressure to buy or sell, both being typically
informed as to the potential uses, each presumably
acting in accordance with their best interests. In
other words, prudent, and that there is no
excessive time requirement on a purchase or a sale,
so it's an arms length."
(T., pg. 314). He further admitted that if you donft have a
buyer then the formula he had utilized in giving his earlier
testimony wouldn't work, and he admitted that the value would
decline until it reached the market level.

(T., pg. 314-

315.)
After the conclusion of Mr. Christensen's testimony,
counsel for Breuer-Harrison moved to strike his testimony on
the grounds that it was speculative in that it was based upon
the unproved assumption that the property could be developed
economically

for

residential

purposes.

326.)
38

(T. , pg.

325-

development of the property became too high, the value of the
land would be reduced.
12.

Although

(T., pg. 306.)

Mr.

Christensen

testified

that

the

ultimate highest and best use of the real property would be
as a residential subdivision development,

(T., pg. 268.)

he

admitted that if the cost of the property together with the
cost

of

development

precluded

its

development

for

residential purposes that some other type of development
would have to be considered as the highest and best use.
(T., pg. 307.)
13.

He further admitted that he had not considered the

possibility that the cost of the property together with the
costs of development would make it economically unfeasible to
develop the property either as residential property or as a
planned unit development.

(T., pg. 306-308.)

He further

admitted that if it was not economically feasible to develop
the property, given its cost and the cost of development that
it would have to be considered for school use, church use,
crop land, grazing land or waste land.
14.

(T., pgs. 307-308).

He further admitted that in determining the highest

and best use that he would have to consider the physical
conditions of the property, the legal ramifications, the
economical feasibility and best use or ideal use,

(T., pg.

3 08) but that he had not considered the economic feasibility
of the development of the property.
He

further

admitted

that

he
37

had

(R 1405, pgs. 307-308).
assumed

that

it

was

an economically feasible manner, you would most likely lose
money, and not make a profit.

(T., pgs. 370-371.)

He

testified that return on investment does not equate to fair
market rental value on raw ground.

(T., pg. 375.)

After hearing the testimony of the appraisers, the trial
court determined that Mr. Christensen's testimony was highly
speculative, and did not establish the fair market rental
value of the land.

The court recognized no other competent

evidence was introduced by Combes as to the fair market
rental value of the real estate.

Since the appraisers called

by Breuer-Harrison established the fair market rental value,
the trial court adopted the highest fair market rental value
established by the Breuer-Harrison appraisers as the fair
market rental value and determined there was no issue to go
to the jury and the court would grant a directed verdict at
the

highest

amount

which

the

Breuer-Harrison

testified was the fair market rental value.

40

witnesses

(T., pg. 425.)

Mr.

Heiskanen

was

recalled

by

Breuer-Harrison,

who

testified that fair return on investment and fair market
rental value were not the same terms, because fair return on
investment

pre-supposed

a profit.

(T. , pg.

349.)

He

further testified that the market value of the land had no
relationship to its fair market rental value.
351.)

(T. , pg.

He further testified that if no one in the Ogden area

were willing to pay $40,000 a year to rent the land that it
would not have a fair market rental value of $40,000 a year,
and he knew of no one who would pay such a price to rent the
land.

(T., pgs. 348-353.)

As a rebuttal witness, Breuer-Harrison called Mr. John
W. Hansen, an Ogden real estate broker to testify regarding
the fair market rental value of the property.

Mr. Hansen was

a member of the Ogden Board, and out of 900 real estate
agents, was one of approximately
Million Dollar Club.

22 who belonged to the

Mr. Hansen did the appraising for the

Federal Land Bank and the PCA Northern Utah and had been
involved

in leasing transactions in the Ogden area.

He

testified that without expending money to improve the real
property,

in

its condition as it existed

at trial, its

highest and best use was for agricultural purposes.
pgs. 361-366.)

(T. ,

He further testified that it was ridiculous

to conclude that the subject property would ever bring a
rental value of $40,000 a year.

(T. , pg. 368.)

He further

testified that if you do not develop property quickly and in
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The main issue presented to the trial court was the
anticipatory breach of an executory contract for the sale of
real property.

There were several Utah cases presented to

the trial court by counsel for Breuer-Harrison which were
directly on point and constituted controlling law.

The trial

court relied upon those cases.
CLAIMS OF WAIVER, ESTOPPEL AND LACHES
Keith Combe's memorandum fails to recognize that the
case at hand deals with an executory real estate contract and
claims of anticipatory breach.

The defense of knowledge and

waiver were not available to Keith Combe as a defense to the
contract claim of Breuer-Harrison that they were entitled to
fee simple unencumbered title.
which

Keith

Combe

places

The following cases upon

reliance,

do

not

support

his

position.
1.

Duaan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239

(Utah 1980) holds

against the position asserted by Keith Combe.
Utah

Supreme

Court

held

that

a

vendee

In Dugan, the
who

discovered

misrepresentations, but nevertheless continued to the date of
trial making regular monthly payments and refusing to amend
the pleadings to pray for rescission, did not waive any claim
for damages.

The Utah Supreme Court stated that a defrauded

vendee has the option to elect to rescind or to affirm the
contract and recover damages.
2.

Zuniga v. Leone, 77 Utah 494, 297 Pac. 1010 (1931),

and Leone v. Zuniga, 84 Utah 417, 34 P2d 699 (1934) are two
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POINT NO. 8
KEITH COMBE'S BRIEF ON APPEAL IGNORES
CONTROLLING UTAH CASE LAW, RELIES UPON
CASE LAW WHICH IS NEITHER IN POINT NOR
SUPPORTIVE OF THE POSITION ASSERTED IN
THE BRIEF.
Although there is substantial controlling Utah case law
directly on point, Combes have chosen to ignore that body of
case

law,

judicial
estate

and

have

instead

chosen

to

rely

upon

generic

statements taken from divorce cases, uniform real

foreclosure cases and other inapplicable cases.

A

review of the cases cited by Combes would take more space
that Breuer-Harrison has available in this brief, however, a
quick overview of Combes1 authority demonstrates that it is
not controlling, is not on point and is in some instances,
misleading.
Warner v. Rasmussen, 704 P. 2d 559 (Utah 1985); Johnson
v. Carman, 572 P.2d 371 (Utah 1977); Soffe v. Ridd. 659 P.2d
1082 (Utah 1983); and Perkins v. Spencer, 121 Utah 468, 243
P.2d

446

(1952)

are

all

uniform

real

estate

contract

foreclosure cases and deal with the issues of the right of a
vendor to regain possession of the property and to retain all
the

payments

made

by

the

buyer.

They

are

all

clearly

distinguishable from an equitable rescission.
When

Combes1

claims

are

analyzed,

it

is

clear

that

Combes want to have the property returned to them and to keep
all

the

payments

made

by

the

vendees,

unconscionable, not an equitable result.
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clearly

an

made, although it may be express or implied."
(Id. at 3.)
5.

B.R. Woodward Marketing v. Collins Food Service, 82

Utah Adv. Rep. 35, 37

(Utah App. 1988) was a claim for

commissions on a sales representatives agreement and has no
application to the case at hand.
6.
a

Barnes v. Wood, 750 P.2d 1226 (Utah App. 1988) was

case

involving

modified

lease

an

action by

against

a landlord

the tenant and

to enforce a

it held that the

landlord had not waived its right to seek arrearages of rent
and taxes.
7.

Perry v. Woodall, 20 Utah 2d 399, 438 P.2d 813

(1968) holds that a buyer of a business who continues in
possession of the business and its assets after discovery of
"all of the facts" demonstrating that "he had been defrauded"
cannot

continue

thereon,

permit

to

operate

the

the

business

to

business,
go

into

make

payments

receivership,

purchase the assets from the receiver, permit all the assets
to be wasted and then sue for rescission, especially when the
buyer has no assets to return to the seller in the event
rescission is granted.
8.

Frailey v. McGarrv, 116 Utah 504, 211 P.2d 840

(1949) involved a vendor who misrepresented the availability
of water to the buyer.

Rather than electing to rescind the

contract upon discovery of the misrepresentation, the buyer
attempted to keep the contract in full effect, obtain the
44

water rights sought from the State of Utah as to the lands to
be conveyed under the contract, transfer those water rights
to other lands and then act to rescind the contract.

The

trial

the

court

contract

granted

conditioned

the

buyer's

request

upon the buyer

rights acquired back to the vendor.

to

rescind

conveying

the water

When the buyer refused

to convey the water rights back to the vendor, the trial
court held the contract was not subject to rescission.

The

Supreme Court held that the buyer could not act upon the
contract as though it was valid to obtain certain water
rights

and

then

after

obtaining

those

rights,

request

rescission, refuse to reconvey those water rights as required
by the contract, and transfer those rights to other lands.
9.

McKellar Real Estate & Investment v. Paxton, 62

Utah 97, 218 P. 128 (1923), is so dissimilar as to render the
case totally inapplicable.

In McKellar, the vendor agreed to

build a hotel in a workmanlike manner.
the

vendor

disagreed.

had

not

substantially

The vendee alleged

performed,

the

vendor

The trial court held that where the vendee

retained possession of the hotel, made major modifications
and changes to the building and did not assert the right to
rescind for a substantial period of time that his inaction
constituted a waiver and acceptance of the building.
10.

Celebrity Club, Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control, 602

P. 2d 689 (Utah 1979) was a case in which the liquor control
commission was estopped from denying a liquor license to a
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cases which arose out of the same contract of sale of a
business•

In the cases, the trial court found that the

buyers, immediately after the transaction, discovered all the
pertinent

facts, and upon discovery

demand for rescission.

of those

facts made

Several months after the demand was

refused, the buyers instituted legal action over one aspect
of the contract, settled the lawsuit by written agreement
which ratified and confirmed the original contract, continued
to maintain and subsequently sold all of the merchandise.
The

court

held

that

all

those

actions

taken

together

constituted a waiver of both the buyer's and seller's causes
of

action.

The

facts

of

Zuniga

and

Leone

are

so

substantially different as to make them not applicable in any
way to the case at hand.
3.

Hunter v. Hunter, 669 P.2d 430 (Utah 1983) is a

divorce case in which the Utah Supreme Court stated:
". . . T o constitute a waiver, one's actions
or conduct must be distinctly made, must evince in
some unequivocal manner an intent to waive, and
must be inconsistent with any other intent."
fid, at 432.)
4.

American Savings & Loan Association v. Blomquist,

21 Utah 2d 289, 445 P.2d 1 (1968), was a mortgage foreclosure
case.

The Utah Supreme Court, quoting

an earlier case

stated:
11

* * * a waiver is the intentional
relinquishment of a known right. To constitute a
waiver, there must be an existing right, benefit,
or advantage, a knowledge of its existence, and an
intention to relinquish it. It must be distinctly
43

potential

licensee

after

the

commission

had

allowed

the

potential licensee to rely upon expected approval and expend
approximately $200,000 upon such reliance.
11.

Leaver v. Grose, 610 P.2d 1262 (Utah 1980) has no

application to the case at hand in that it involves the
construction of a basement apartment in violation of the
restrictive covenants of the subdivision.
12.

Papanikolas Bros. Ent. v. Suaarhouse Shopping Ctr.

A. , 535 P. 2d 1256 (Utah 1975) involves the enforcement of a
restrictive covenant creating a parking easement.
As can readily been seen by a sampling of the cases
cited by Combes in their brief, they are not on point, and
some hold against the position claimed by Combes.

It is not

possible to distinguish each and every string citation which
Combes rely upon in their brief to support their claims,
however the foregoing sampling demonstrates the extremely
unreliable* and in some instances reckless reliance upon the
cases cited.
POINT NO. 9
THE DOCTRINE THAT ONE WHO SEEKS EQUITY
MUST DO EQUITY AND THE DOCTRINE OF
UNCLEAN HANDS PREVENTS KEITH COMBE FROM
RELYING UPON THE THEORY OF WAIVER, LACHES
AND ESTOPPEL AS A DEFENSE TO THE CLAIM OF
RESCISSION.
It is a fundamental tenet of Equity that one seeking
equity must do equity.

Here, the guilty party, the one who

cannot convey title as promised, now seeks to rely upon an
equitable doctrine to avoid having to perform under the terms
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of the contract.

In addition, the guilty party, Combes want

to retain the return of the property which they have already
received, and in addition they want to keep all the payments
made by the buyers.

Their position is not only inequitable

it is unreasonable and outrageous.
POINT NO. 10
KEITH
COMBES ASSERTION THAT THE
BIFURCATION OF THE TRIAL WAS PREJUDICIAL
TO KEITH COMBE IS NOT WELL TAKEN.
After the trial court had granted Plaintiffs1 BreuerHarrison' s Motion for Summary Judgment, and Defendants ATGF
and Froerer's Motions for Summary Judgment, there was only
one issue left to be tried in regard to Keith Combe.

The

only issue in which Keith Combe had standing to assert a
position was the issue of the refund, if any, to be paid by
Keith Combe to Breuer-Harrison.

At that stage of the record,

all the claims of Keith Combe against ATGF and Froerer had
been dismissed.
Keith Combe asserts in his Brief that he had the right
to assert "defenses based on the wrongdoing of Froerer and
ATGF".

Since the only issue to be tried was the refund, if

any, to be paid by Keith Combe to Breuer-Harrison, no such
defenses
assertion

were
that

available
the

to

Keith

court's

ruling

Combe.
gave

His
him

further

"inadequate

opportunity to prepare new theories of defense" is wholly
without merit.

The only issues to be tried were:

(1)

What

payments had Breuer-Harrison paid to Keith Combe and Clair
47

Combe; and (2)

What was the fair market rental value of the

property during the time that Breuer-Harrison had possession
of the property.

Any claims by Keith Combe regarding the

wrongdoing of Froerer and ATGF as to the two issues to be
tried would have been totally irrelevant, and as far as the
jury was concerned would have been highly prejudicial as
against Breuer-Harrison for the reason that Keith Combe would
have been attempting to convince, by inference, the jury that
insurance was involved and so the jury should reduce the
amount Keith Combe owed to Breuer-Harrison.
The trial court correctly determined that such claims
were irrelevant to the issue of the payments and the fair
market rental value and correctly granted the request for a
bifurcation of the issues for trial.

The mere assertion by

Keith Combe that he was prejudiced does not rise to the level
of demonstrating a prejudice.
At the trial, the parties stipulated to the amount paid
by

Breuer-Harrison

and

the

trial

court

stipulation as binding upon the parties.

received

the

As a result, there

was only one issue left to be tried, and that issue was the
fair market rental value of the property.

That issue was

tried and a decision rendered thereon.
RELIEF SOUGHT
Breuer-Harrison seek to affirm the decision rendered by
the Trial Court.
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A D D E N D U M

THIS AGREEMENT, made this 39
day of
s^gM-r
>\
A.O., 197Q , by and between KEITH ?. CCM3E and EVELYN C0M3E, his ;
wife, ancfTlRST SECURITY 3ANK, N.A., Ocden, Utah, Trustee,
!
hereinafter designated as Seller, and CASPER J. 5REUER and
!•
WILLIAM M. HARRISON of Fuilerton, California, hereinafter desig- I
nated as the 3uyer.
j
WITNESSETH: That the Seller, for the consideration
herein mentioned agrees to sell and convey to the Buyer, and the
Buyer for the consideration herein mentioned agrees to purchase
the following described real property, situate in the County of
Weber, State of Utah, to-wit:
See Schedule A attached hereto and made a part
hereof.

j
!
j
j
!

1
1. Said Buyer hereby agrees to enter into possession
\
and pay for said described premises the sum cf FOUR HUNDRED TEN
THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED EIGHTY ($410,380.00) DOLLARS, (the exact
|
purchase price to be determined after survey; the purchase price ;
to be determined by multiplying the number of acres by $21,4 00.00)!
payable at the office of Seller, his assigns or order _ _ _ _ _ _ !
loiiowmg times, :o-wi;: SEVENTY-FIVE THOUSAND ($7 5,000.00)
j
DOLLARS cash, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, and
j
the balance of THREE HUNDRED' THIRTY-FIVE THOUSAND ZZGH7 HUNDRED j
EIGHTY ($335,380.00) DOLLARS shall be paid as follows:
j

i
Buyer shall pay to Seller interest only for the
first four (4) years of this' contract payable on
the 31st day of December, beginning December 31,
1930. On December 31, 1983, Seller shall pay the
balance of the purchase price, principal and
interest in full.

!
I
j
j
;
1

Possession of said premises shall be delivered to 3uyer on the
j
31 day of December, 197 9.
j
2. Said payments are to be applied first to the payment!
of interest and second to the reduction of the principal.
|
Interest shall be charged from December 31 , 1979 on ail unpaid j
portions of the purchase price at the rate of TEN AND ONE-HAL?
(10 1/2%) VZ^CZU'T per annum.
3. The Buyer hereby agrees to pay a late fee of Four (4?
Percent of any payment that is paid Fifteen (15) Days after the j
date such payment is due.
i

4. In order to facilitate the performance of the terms \
and conditions of this agreement and to allow for the orderly
j
subdivision and development of said property by the Buyer, the
j
Seller and Buyer agree that an escrow-trust agreement designating j
(to be mutually designated at a later date), as Escrow Agent-Trustc
with appropriate instructions to act in such capacity shall be
j
executed by the parties. Seller shall forthwith execute and
i
deliver to said trustee a good and sufficient Warranty Deed
•
conveying subject property to said Trustee, with authority for
j
said Trustee to record said conveyance and to thereafter convey
title by Special Warranty Deed to Buyer upon 3uyer's compliance
|
with the terms and conditions herein set forth and as specifically!
provided for in said Escrow-Trust Agreement. Said escrow
,

EXHIBIT "A"

agreement shall provide authority to said Trustee to execute and
deliver deeds of reconveyance back to the Seller m tne event
Buyer defaults.

!

a. Such Trustee herein is authorized and instructed;
to sign and execute, at the request of 3uyer, any and ail sub;
division plats, protective covenants, easements, and rignts-of,
way which may be necessary or convenient for the orderly develop- I
ment of the subject property, upon presentation of the same by
i
the 3uyer by its duly authorized representatives.
b. The Escrow Holder-Trustee to be authorized and I
empowered to convey all, or part, of said property to Buyer for I
the purpose of obtaining financing for cost of installation of thej
required off-site improvements throughout the subdivision. In
addition, said construction mortgage or trust deed for the
financing of said off-site improvements shall not be an amount
to exceed the engineer's estimated cost in accordance with bids
received from reliable contractors for the construction of such
|
improvements, and provided Trustee shall be immediately reconveyed
all of the subject property herein after the execution and
recordation of any such trust deed or mortgage executed by
obligation or encumbrance. It is fully understood and agreed,
however, that Trustee will assume no obligation nor liability
i
for the repayment of any such loan, and that all such loan proceeds shall be under the control of a reliable lending institution
to insure compliance that such funds are expended solely for the
purpose of the construction of the required off-site improvements,
and for no other purpose. Seller, 3uyer and Escrow-Trustee shall
have the right, upon request, to have an audit of expenditures of
all such loan proceeds. Such off-site improvements may include
engineering, road/ water system, sewer, curb and gutter, sidewalk,
storm sewer and land fill.
c. Neither Seller nor Escrow Holder-Trustee shall
be under any obligation to incur any expense in connection with
the planning, laying out, approval or development of the subject
property/ and Buyer agrees to hold Seller and Escrow Holder-Trustee
harmless from any liability in connection with such development.
Neither Escrow Holder-Trustee nor Seller are in any way engaged
in the selling of any lots or improved property hereunder, and
that this transaction is the sale by the Seller to Buyer of
unimproved acreage for such development purposes as the Buyer
may elect to utilize the same.
d. Seller hereby authorizes, empowers and instructs
the Escrow Holder-Trustee, if requested by Buyer, to execute ail
documents reasonably necessary to subdivide, plat, and improve
the subject property or to annex said property or any portion
thereof to an adjacent municipality or any water, sewer, or other
improvement district as may be necessary or convenient, provided
that nothing herein shall require the Escrow Holder-Trustee, or
Seller, to furnish any bonds or other obligation in connection
with any such development, annexation, subdivision, or the
installation of any improvements upon any of the subject property.
5. Buyer hereby acknowledges that it has inspected
the premises purchased hereunder, and that it is familiar wizh
the locution, condition and terrain thereof; that said property
is sold hereunder on an "as is" basis only. The Seller hereoy
expressly disclaims any and all warranties and representations,
express or implied, as to the state of the property/ its condition, quality/ character, or suitability or fitness for any sue,
whether existing or contemplated, matters of zoning, or in ether
respect.

6. Seller agrees that after receipt of the down payment
ner einabove provided for, that they will release lots to 3 uyer
for all subsequent principal payments at the rate of one 1 . 1 C m, «.
ry prorata percentage of principal received from Buyer, said
! eve
pro rata percentage to be determined by dividing the princi
bal ance due bv the number of lots obtained in the subdivis ion.
*.
(50) lots were obtained in the subdivision
For example, II- ta i e ty
the
balance
due
was $335,880.00, Seller would release o
and
Buy er one lot for every $6,717.60 of principal received (n ot
cou nting the $75,000.00 down payment)
($335,380.00 divided
by 50 equals $6,717.60.)
be ororated as of the date of final
:axes shai
contract of sale. Taxes after 1979 shall be paid by 3uyer.
3. Seller warrants that there are no liens or encumbrances on the property hereinabove described and agrees to
furnish to 3uyer at Seller's expense a title policy showing ;
good and marketable title in said property (said title policy to
be furnished at the time of the receipt of down payment from
Buyer).
Further, Seller agrees to execute and deliver to 3uyer,
or assigns, good and sufficient warranty deeds covering title to
the above described property when subdivided and as paid for in
accordance with the terms hereinabove set out.
In the event of a failure to comoiv wit
the terms
hereof by the 3uyer, or upon failure of the 3uyer to make any
payment or payments when the same shall become due, or within
thirty (30) days thereafter, the Seller, at his option shall have
the following
:ernative remedies:

propertyj and aim p o l e n t a which he^vQ be»eft
- « • :
afta,.^ se r o c e 'J.
,3 UM : J & J I J«!
•i-^cr-eg—yi-gui-da tec—damage a f e r she non^Qor z Qgmar.s^
1
jii'ic thu Buyer aqrooo aha* tho- 9*2rl e*—ma y—a t
''•iintej arte ' ^aice s e a a e a a i c n ci—said premiaea w i t h o u t
l e g a l proceoGQG ac in «S-G f i r o t and f o j w e j i.afcate; fcoge-shor wi-1h
rmprj'^ s:.ie:rL3 JIAC j.acition.5 rr.ace jy t.-.e j u y e r t h e r e o n ; a
•said additions—and—-fern provementi5 s h a l l rQn^-fw>*]reh—-fehe-—*and—and
beu^.im „lie jrgper^-y—&£—tehe—oe-sareg-,—£a^—3<»»ye-g—&e«omirf>c a t once—a
w^v.,1 or-tr,'
b. The Seller may bring suit and recover judgment
for all delinquent installments, including costs and attorney's
fees.
(The use of this remedy on one or more occasions shall
not prevent the Seller, at his option, from resorting to one of
tne other remedies hereunder in the event of a subsequent default)
or
c. The Seller shall have the right, at his option,
and upon written notice to the 3uyer, to declare the entire
un?a id balance hereunder at once due and payable, and may elect
to reat this contract as a note and mortgage, and pass title to
the Suyer subject thereto, and oroceed immediately to foreclose
the same in accordance with the laws of-the State of Utah, and
have the property sold and the proceeds applied to the payment
:he balance owing, including costs and attorney's fees; and
o
the Seller may have a judgment for any deficiency which may

remain. In the case of foreclosure, the Seller hereunder, upcn
the filing of a complaint, shall be immediately entitled to tr.e
appointment of a receiver to t&*e possession of said mortgaged
property and collect the rents, issues and profits therefrom and
apply the same to the payment of the obligation hereunder, or
hold the same pursuant to order of the court; and the Seller,
upon entry of judgment of foreclosure, shall be entitled to the
possession of the said premises during the period of redemption.
10.

It is agreed that time is the essence of this

agreement.
11. In the event there are any liens or encumbrances
against said premises other than those herein provided for or
referred to, or in the event any liens or encumbrances other
than herein provided for shall hereafter accrue against the same
by acts or neglect of the Seller, then the 3uyer may, at his
option, pay and discharge the same and receive credit on the
amount then remaining due hereunder in the amount of any such
payment or payments and thereafter the payments herein provided
to be made, may, at the option of the 3uyer, be suspended until
such a time as such suspended payments shall equal any sums
advanced as aforesaid.
12. The 3uyer and Seller each agree that should they
default in any of the*covenants or agreements contained herein,
that the defaulting party shall pay ail costs and expenses,
including a reasonable attorney's fee, which may arise or accrue
from enforcing this Agreement, or in obtaining possession of the
premises covered hereby, or in pursuing any remedy provided
hereunder or by the statutes of the State of Utah whether such
remedy is pursued by filing a suit or otherwise.
13. It is understood that the stipulations aforesaid
are to apply to and bind the heirs, executors, administrators,
successors, and assigns of the respective parties hereto.
IN WITNESS WHERSOF, the said parties to this agreement
have hereunto signed their names, the day and year first above
written.

Kei^h ?• Combe

asuei „jt ai sue-

William M. Harrison
3UYER

_

SCHESUL:: A
PARCEL I;
,_
Beginning at the Southwest corner of tne Ncr: wes: Quar er
of the Northwest Quarter of Section 23, Township 5 North, Range
1 West, Salt Lake Meridian, U.S. Survey; and running znencz
East 238 feet, tnence North 900 feet, rr.ore or less, to the cente
of Combe Road, thence Northwesterly along said centerime to a
point North of beginning, thence South 930 feet, more or less,
to the place of beginning. Containing 5 acres, more or less.
PARCEL 2:
3eginnmc at a point 753 feet East> of the Southwest corner of
the Nortnwest Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of Section 23,
Township 5 North, Range 1 West, Salt Lake Meridian, U.S. Survey:
Running*thence East 174.36 feet; thence North 625 feet, more
or less, to the centeriine of Combe Road; whence Northwesterly
along said centeriine to a point North of beginning; thence
South 750 feet, more or less, to the point of beginning.
Containing 2.75 acres.
PARCEL 3:
Beginning at a point 937,36 feet East of the Southwest corner
of the Northwest Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of Section
.23, Township 5 North, Range 1 West, Salt Lake Meridian, U.S.
Survey; running thence East 60.7 3 feet; thence Northeasterly
to a point on the center of Combe Road, said point being East
197.88 feet and North 0o04'30* West 571.02 feet to the centerline of Combe Road s.nd Northwesterly along said centeriine
15 feet; thence Northwesterly along centeriine of said road to
a point North of beginning; thence South 625 feet to the place
of beginning.
PARCEL 4:
Beginning at a point 233 feet East of the Southwest corner
of the Northwest Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of Section
23, Township 5 North, Range 1 West, Salt Lake Meridian,
U.S. Survey; and running thence East 250 feet, thence North
835 feet, more or less, to the center of Combe Road, thence
Northwesterly along said centeriine to a point North of
beginning; thence South 900 feet, more or less, to the place
of beginning. Containing 5 acres, more or less.
PARCEL 5:
Beginning 488 feet East of the Southwest corner of the
Northwest Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of Section 23,
Township 5 North, Range 1 West, Salt Lake 3ase and Meridian;
and running thence East 275 feet, thence North 750 feet,
more or less, to the center of the County Road, thence Northwesterly along the center of said County Road to a point
North 835 feet, more or less, from the point of beginning,
thence South 835 feet, more or less, to the point of beginning,
Containing 3.40 acres.

AMENDMENT TO R£AL. ESTATE CONTRACT
This Amendment is made this J V ^ day of November, 1982,
by and between XEITH ?. COMBE and EVELYN COMBE, his Wife, and
FIRST SECURITY BANK, N.A., Ogden, Utah, Trustee (hereinafter
designated as "Sellers") and CASPER J. 3REUER and WILLIAM M.
HARRISON of Fullerton, California (hereinafter designated as
"Buyers").
This Agreement amends the Real Estate Contract dated
December 29, 1979 for the sale of property as described in
Exhibit "A" attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference.
This Agreement amends the terms of the sale outlined in
Paragraph 1 of said Contract as follows:
"Buyers shall pay to Sellers interest only for
the first six (6) years of this Contract, payable on
the 31st day of December, beginning on December 31,
1980. On December 31, 1985, Sellers shall pay the
balance of the purchase price, principal and interest
in full."
Except for the above Amendment, all other terms and conditions of the Real Estate Contract dated December 29, 197 9
shall remain the same and in full force and effect.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties to this Amendment have
hereunto signed their names on the day and year first-above
written.
SELLERS:

( ^a^S^/C

v- L^^y^cL^

XEITH ?. COMBE
•*£<. LC -^

EVELYN COMBE
FIRST SECURITY BANK, N.A.
By: Security Title Company

BUYERS:

wt

CASPER JL 3KEUTR

(

* PLAINTIFFS
\
EXHIBIT

WILLIAM M. HAilRI30tf

This agreement is made this 3rd day cf Janu
and between Keith F. Combe and Evelyn Combe, his Wife, and First
Security Bank, N.A., Ogden, Utah, Trustee (herei.nafzer zesicnated
as "Sellers") and Casper J. Breuer and William M . Harrison of
Fuiierton, California (hereinafter cesignatec as "Buyers").
This Agreement amends the terms of the Real Estate Contract
dated December 29, 197? for tne sale of property described in
Exhibit "A" attached hereto and incorporated he rein by reference.
This agreement amends the terms of the sale outlined in
Paragraph 1 of said contract as .follows:
For the period Dec. 31, 1981 to Dec. 3 1, 1962, Seller is
owed 535,267.40 in interest. Seller agrees, for this period only,
to accept a payment of $17,633.71 (one-half of the amount due)
and to defer the payment of the balance, $17,6 33 71, until July 1,
19S3. The deferred amount shall accrue interest at the rate of
TEN AND ONE-HALF (10 1/2%) PERCENT per annum.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties to this Ame ndment have
hereunto signed their names on the day and year first-above
written.
SELLERS: -v
KEITH P.COMBE
'•-c.-*- •

EVELYN COMBE
FIRST SECURITY BANK, N.A.
By : ^acwriL; To. Lie Compan;
•I* a^»

Za^iAji*=—

BUYERS
-•I/^<,LA^ /^-'

y\A

CASPER J. BREUER

*

v

. —is

WILLIAM M.

Pt

'/

H/iRRISON

i £W

s

This Amendment is made this ^ >' "~vday of February, 1934 by and
between KEITH P. CCMBE and EVELYN CCMBE, his Wife, and FIRST SECURITY
BANK, N.A., Ogden, Utah, Trustee (hereinafter designated as "Sellers")
and CASPER J. BREUER and WILLIAM M. HARRISON of Fullerton, California
(hereinafter designated as "3uyers").
This Agreement amends the Real Estate Contract dated Decanber 29,
1979 for the sale of property as described in Exhibit MAM attached
hereto and incorporated herein by reference.
This Agreement amends the terms of the sale outlined in Paragraph
#1 of said Contract as follows:
"Buyers shall pay to Sellers interest only for the
first six (6) years of this Contract, payable on
the 31st day of December, beginning on December 31,
1980. On December 31, 1985, Sellers shall pay the
balance of the purchase price, principal and interest
in full. Seller does agree that when $120,000.00 or more
is paid towards the principle during the contract period,
that seller will extend the contract rraturity date until
Decanber 31, 1988. Seller will accept the principle
amount stated above in a lump sum payment or in aggregrate payments that will total that amount or more."

ft'
Real
in full force and effect.

&

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties to this Amendment have hereunto
signed their names on the day and year first-above written.
bf.i

ii

nlw

EVELYN COMBE
FIRST SECURITY BA^, M.A.
-a*

BUYEgSr
J*- 3-^V^;

^
/Y CJ' -uC

^vU\
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AMENDMENT TO REAL ESTATE CONTRACT

This Amendment is made this .J,//" day of February, 193*
by and between KEITH P. COMBE and EVELYN COMBE, his Wife, and
FIRST

SECURITY

designated
HARRISON

as
of

BANK,

N.A.,

"Sellers") and
Fullerton,

Ogden,

Utah,

CASPER

California

J.

Trustee

(hereinafter

3REUER and WILLIAM M.

(hereinafter

designated

as

"Buyers").
This Agreement

amends the Real Estate Contract dated

December 29, 1979 for the sale of property as described in Exhibit
"A" attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference.
This Agreement amends the terms of the sale outlined
in Paragraph #6 of said Contract as follows:
"Buyer and Seller understand that a condominium
developement

is going

to be

constructed

on the West

15 acres of the property, i.e., the west' portion of
Skyline Drive.

The development will contain

approximately 90 condos to be constructed in 5 phases.
The first phase will contain 14 units on approximately
2/2 acres.

The second

phase will contain 12 units

on approximately 2li acres. As each unit sells and closes
the

seller

will

($33 5,380 -

90).

receive

$3732.00

Seller agrees

principle

payment.

to subordinate

the

initial 2% acres of ground needed in the first phase
to a construction

and development Loan, the proceeds

of which shall be strictly applied to improvements to
the property.
subordinate

Seller may thereafter agree to
additional

parcels

of

ground

upon

further terms and conditions as the parties may
thereafter agree.

j PLAINTIFFS

|

JXHlBfT

I 2^_

such

rage c

Except for the above Amendment, and the Amendment dated

Qk°* day

of

February,

198^, ail other terms and

conditions

of the Real Estate Contract dated December 29, 1979, shall remain
the same and in full force and effect.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties to this Amendment have
hereunto signed their names on the day and year first-above
written.

SELLERS:

(7^4_
iZVELiTN CCMBE

BUYERS:

^ •JASPER

r

k'p

••

^

j . aasyfiR-

WiLi^AM M. HARRISON

7"

'zr>

TITLE GUARANTY FUND, INC.
TW U w y r n ' Or^mmtmOmm 1m I—tim* Tttkm ••

b>"

to*

Denver, Co4or»4o

Robert E. Froerer
Issued By.
(Member's Name)
536 24th Street, Suite 2B

k>
k>
k>''

(Address)
Ogden, Utah
84401

POLICY OF TITLE INSURANCE
OWNERS
SUBJECT TO THE EXCLUSIONS FROM COVERAGE, THE EXCEPTIONS CONTAINED IN SCHEDULE
B AND THE PROVISIONS OF THE CONDITIONS AND STIPULATIONS HEREOF, Attorneys' Title
Guaranty Fund, Inc., a Colorado Corporation, herein called the Company, insures, as of Date of Policy
shown in Schedule A, against loss or damage, not exceeding the amount of insurance stated in Schedule
A, and costs, attorneys' fees and expenses which the Company may become obligated to pay hereunder,
sustained or incurred by the insured by reason of:

£=>:

1. Title to the estate or interest described in Schedule A being vested otherwise than as stated therein;
2. Any defect in or lien or encumbrance on such title;
3. Lack of a right of access to and from the land;

b>::

4. Unmarketability of such title.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the Company has caused this Policy to be signed and sealed, to be valid when
Schedule A is countersigned by an authorized officer or agent of the Company, ail in accordance with its
By-Laws.

*£>'

_<r£\ x V\
ATTORNEYS' TITLE GUARANTY FUNO. INC.
V'v BY

ATTEST:
**£>

f:!SEAL);|

'$£
!•>/
£>•

Wilford W Kirton. Jr.. President

Fletcher Thomas. Secretary

PS
PL*

Sis

This policy must contain Schedules A and B
duly validated by this signature:
/;

" «. J
L.A1 , 1 "

'\t

if *.

D

)?

PC'
.tf..v..'//vf./vV/^^^./y\1v.kv./v\.v.luJi^1V:lv./v\.v./v\/v\A

V

7 /J..V..V .V..V V.V

.^

AMOUNT

POLICY Of THIE INSURANCE

DATE Of POUCT

SCHEDULE A
* 410,380.00
NAME OF INSURED
The Equitable Estate created by a Uniform Real Estate Contract
dated January 9, 1980, executed by KEITH P. CCMBE, and EVELYN CCMBE,
his wife, and FIRST SECURITY BANK, N.A., Cgden, Utah, Trustee, as
Seller, and CASPER J* BREUER and WILLIAM ML HARRISCN, as Buyer.
Premium $ l?fi? 50

Novrsnter 14, 1980
at.

8:24
o'clock_^_M.

1. The estate or interest in the land described herein and which is covered by this policy is:
An interest pursuant to that certain Uniform Real Estate Contract dated January 9, 198(
by and between KEITH P. CCMBE and EVELYN^ his wife, and FIRST SECURITY BANK N.A., Tn^stee
2. The estate or interest referred to herein is at Date of Policy vested in as Seller, and CASPER J. BRE
and WILLIAM M. HARRISCN, as
Parcels #1 thru #4: Keith P. Ccmbe and Evelyn Caitoe
Buy<
Parcel #5: First Security Bank N.A., Trustee, and Keith P. Combe and Evelyn
3. The land referred to in this Policy is situate in the County of.
WEBER
State of Utah, and is described as follows:

(SEE ATTACHED SCHEDULE A)

countersigned: fobert £. Froerer
Issued ati

Ogden, Weber County, Utah

Authorised Officer or Area!

Policy
THIS POLICY VALID ONLY IF SCHEDULE B IS ATTACHED

QN2

14 5 0 9

SCHEDULE A

PARCEL 1•
fcifrmuTig at the Southwest corner of the Northwest Quarter
of the Northwest Quarter of Section 23, Township 5 North, Range
1 West, Salt Lake Meridian, U.S. Survey; and running thence
East 233 feet, thence North 900 feet, more or less, to the center
of Combe Road, thence Northwesterly along said ccnterline to a
point North of beginning, thence South 930 feet, more or less,
to the place of beginning. Containing 5 acres, more or less.
PARCEL 2:
Beg inning at a point 763 feet East of the Southwest corner of
the Northwest Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of Section 23,
Township 5 North, Range 1 West, Salt Lake Meridian, U.S. Survey:
Running thence East 174.36 feet; thence North 625 feet, more
or less, to the centerlina of Combe Road; thence Northwesterly
along said centerline to a point North of beginning; thence
South 750 feet, more or less, to the point of beginning.
Containing 2.75 acres.
PARCEL 3:
beginning at a point 937.36 feet East of the Southwest corner
of the Northwest Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of Section
23, Township 5 North, Range 1 West, Salt Lake Meridian, U.S.
Survey; running thence East 60.73 feet; thence Northeasterly
to a point on the center of Combe Road, said point being East
197.88 feet and North Q # 04«30' West 571.02 feet to the centerline of Combe Road and Northwesterly along said centerline
IS feet; thence Northwesterly along centerline of said road to
a point North of beginning; thence South 625 feet to the place
of beginning.
PARCEL <:
Beginning at a point 238 feet East of the Southwest corner
of the Northwest
*cst Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of Sectic
Section
23, Township 5 North, Range 1 West, Salt Lake Meridian,
U.S. Survey; and running thence East 250 feet, thence North
I 335 feet, more or less, to the center of Combe Road, thence
!> Northwesterly along said centerline to a point North of
jj beginning; thence South 900 feet, more or less, to the place
\of beginning.
Containing 5 acres, more or less.

V PARC£L 5:
I beginning 438 feet East of the Southwest corner of the
Northwest Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of Section 23,
Township 5 North, Range 1 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian;
and running thence East 275 feet, thence North 750 feet,
mure or less, to the center of the County Road, thence Northwesterly along the center of said County Road to a point
North 835 feet, more or less, from the point of beginning,
thence South 835 feet, more or less, to the point of beginning

CONDITIONS AND STIPULATIONS—CONTINUED
ptlons to Pay or Otherwise Settle Claims
^e Company shall have the option to pay or otherwise settle tor or in the name
insured claimant any claim insured against or to terminate all iiapiiity and
aiions of the Company hereunder py paying or tendering payment of the
jnt o* insurance under this ooncy together with any costs attorneys tees and
nses incurred uo to tne time of sucn payment or tender ot payment Py tne
ed claimant and a u t h o r e d Dv the Company
nomination and Payment of LOSS
he iiaoiiity of tne Company under tn?s policy shall in no case exceed the least
i tne actual ioss of tne insured claimant or
i tne amount of insurance stated m Schedule A
he Company win pay m addition to any loss insured against py this policy ai»
imposed uoon an insured m litigation earned on py the Company tor sucn
ec and an costs attorneys tees and exoensesm litigation earned on py such
ed w.m tne written autnomation of the Company
vnen i.aothty nas oeen definitely fixed m accordance with the conditions of
>oiicy tne ioss or damage snail oe payaoie witnm 30 days thereafter
rotation of UsOlllty
C 3 » s ^ ?' fs<> c nerr.a ma r*ar *• ,^de' mi? pone v ia> if me Comoany atte#
g receded not.ee of an alleged defect nen or encumorance insured against
mde' by litigation or otherwise removes such detect den or encumorance
tab S^PS me t.tie as >nsu'ea *•!*•*" a reasonaoie time after receiot of sucn
p (Pi m tne e*en: of litigation until there has be^r\ a final determination py a
o'competent IU*" sdict<on and disposition of an aopeais therefrom adverse
t tine as insurec as provided m paragraph 3 hereof or (c) for iiaoiiity
tamy assumed P> an insured m settling any claim or suit witnout prior written
»nt of the Company
juctlon of Liability
payments under this policy exceot payments made tor costs attorneys
mo exoenses snail reduce the amount of the insurance pro tanto No
pnt snail be made without producing this policy for endorsement of such
?nt umess the policy be lost or destroyed m which case proof of such loss or
jct.on snail be furnished to the satisfaction of the Company
iblllty Noncumulatlve
s expressly understood that the amount of insurance under this policy shall
Juced by any amount the Company may pay under any policy insuring either
mortgage snown or referred to m Schedule B hereof which is a lien on the
» or m'erest covered by this policy or (b) a mortgage hereafter executed by
,ured which is a charge or lien on the estate or interest described or referred
Schedule A and the amount so paid snail be deemed a payment under this
1 The Company shall have the option to apply to the payment of any such
jages any amount that otherwise would be payable hereunder to the insured
r of the estate or interest covered by this policy and the amount so paid snail

be deemed a payment under this policy to said insured owner
10. A p p o r t i o n m e n t

^

if the land aescnoed m Schedule A consists of two or more parcels whicn a
not used as a single sue and a ioss is established affecting one or more of sa
parcels but not an the ioss snatt be comouted anc settled on a oro rata oasis as
the amount of insurance unoer this poi«cv was divided pro rata as to tne vaii
on Oate of Poiicv o4 each separate parcel to me wnoie exclusive of any m
iprovements maoe suoseouent to Oate of Policy umess a ••^oiiity or value n
otherwise oe^r> agreed uoon as to each sucn parcel by me Company and ti
insured at the time of tne issuance of mis policy and shown py an expre
statement nerem or by ar\ endorsement attached hereto
11. Subrogation Upon Payment or Settlement
Whenever the Comoany snaif nave settled a claim under this poi»cy an ngnt
subrogation snail vest m me Company unaffected by any act of me msun
claimant The Comoany snail be subrogated to and be entitled to an rights ai
remedies wnich such insured claimant would have nad agamst any person
property in resoect to sucn claim nad this poncy not Q^er\ issued and if repuesti
by tne Comoany such insured claimant shall transfer to the Company an rigr
and remedies agamst any oerson or property necessary m order to perfect su<
ngnt of suOrogation and snail permit me Company to use the name of su<
insured claimant m any transaction or litigation involving such ngntsor remedn
n tne payment does not co.er me loss of such insured claimant me Compai
snail be subrogated to sucn rights and remedies m me proportion which sa
payment bears tp the amount of said loss If loss should result t-om any act of sui
insured claimant such act shall not void this poncy but the Company m m
event snail be reputed to pay only that pan of any losses insured agair
hereunder which snail exceed the amount if any lost to the Company by reason
the impairment of the ngnt of subrogation
12. Liability Limited to this Policy
This instrument together with all endorsements and other instruments if ar
attached hereto by the Comoany is me entire poncy and contract between ti
insured and me Company
Any claim of loss or damage wnether or not based on negligence and wh»<
arises out of the status of me title to the estate or interest covered hereoy or ai
action asserting such claim shall be restricted to the provisions and conditio)
and stipulations of this policy
No amendment of or endorsement to this oolicy can be made except I
writing endorsed hereon or attached hereto signed by either the President a Vu
President the Secretary and Assistant Secretary or validating officer
authorized signatory of the Company
13. Notices. Where Sent
All notices required to be given the Comoany and any statement m wntu
required to be furmsned me Company shall be addressed tp as Home Office

THIS POLICY IS NOT TRANSFERABLE TO SUBSEQUENT OWNERS A REISSUE POLICY IN FAVOR OF NEW PURCHASERS SHOULD BE OBTAINED
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This policy docs not insure against loss by reason of the following.

PART ONE: This part of Schedule B refers to matters which, if any such exist, may affect the title to said land, but which
are nut shown in this policy:
1. Taxes or assessments which arc not shown as existing liens by the records of any taxing agency or by the public records, and casements, liens or encumbrances which arc not shown by the public records.
2. Rii'htb or claim* of persons »n possession of said land which are not shown by the public records.
3. Any facts, rights, interest, or claims which are not shown by the public records but which could be ascertained by an
inspection of said land, or by making inquiry of persons in possession thereof, or by a correct survey.
4. M nine claims, reservations in patents, water rights, claims or title to water.
5. Proceedings for municipal improvement, which, at the date hereof, are shown by the official records of any such city,
but have not resulted in the imposition of a lien upon, or establishment of an easement over, or adjudication of the
right to a public use of said land or any part thereof.
PART TWO. This pan of Schedule B shows liens, encumbrances, defects and other matters affecting the title to said land
or to which said title is subject:

Taxes for year 1980 are a lien, not yet due. Tax I.D. numbers: #1, 07-086-0033?
#2, 07-086-0039; #3, 07-086-0040; #4, 07-086-0034; #5, 07-086-0016.
Property is subject to easements to the Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Canpany
as described by document recorded in Book 1267, page 281 in the records of Weber County.
Property is within the boundaries of the Weber Basin Water Conservancy District, and the
Uintah Highlands Sewer Inprovement District, and is subject to any and all assessments
levied by said districts.
Unrecorded Peal Estate Contract dated January 9, 1980, by and between KEITH P. CCMBE
and EVELYN COMBE, his wife, and FIRST SECURITY BANK N.A., Trustee, as Seller, and
CASPER J. BREUER, and WILLIAM M. HARRISCN, as Buyer.
The Company shall assume no liability under this policy to the extent that loss or
damage arises from failure to record the instrument or instruments necessary to
evidence the estate or interest covered by this policy.
Right of Trustee or Receiver in the even of bankruptcy, receivership or insolvencyof the Seller to repudiate the Contract.
This policy does not insure or guarantee performance by the Seller, his heirs,
successors and assigns, under the Terms of the Contract.
Property taxes for 1978 and 1979 are a lien on Parcel #1 and Parcel #4. Amount due
on Parcel #1: $581.30 for 1978, $552.59 for 1979. Arount due on Parcel #4: $581.30
1978 and $552.59 for 1979.

!ountcrsiened:

Robert E. Froerer

Autfiorued Officer or Agent

POLICY SERIAL NO. O-

14509

The typed serial number above MUST be the same
as the printed serial number on Schedule A.

TITLE GUARANTY FUND, INC.
COVERAGE SAME AS A. L. T A OWNER'S POLICY. FORM B 1970 AMENDED 10-17-70
EXCLUSIONS FROM COVERAGE
The following matters are expressly excluded from the coverage of this policy
1 Any law, ordinance or governmental regulation (including but not limited to building and zoning ordinances)
restricting or regulating or prohibiting the occupancy use or enjoyment of the land, or regulating the character,
dimensions or location of any improvement now or hereafter erected on the land, or prohibiting a separation in
ownership or a reduction in the dimensions or area of the land, or the effect of any violation of any such law,
ordinance or governmental regulation.
2. Rights of eminent domain or governmental rights of police powerunlessnoticeof the exercise of such rights appears in the public records at Date of Policy
3 Defects hens encumbrances adverse claims or other matters (a) created suffered, assumed or agreed to by
the insured claimant, (b) not known to the Company and not shown by the public records but known to the insured claimant either at Date of Policy or at the date such claimant acquired an estate or interest insured by
this policy and not disclosed in writing by the insured claimant to the Company prior to the date such insured
claimant became an insured hereunder; (c) resulting in no loss or damage to the insured claimant, (d) attaching
or created subsequent to Date of Policy, or (e) resultmq in loss or damage which would not have been sustained
if the insured claimant had paid value for the estate or interest insured by this policy

CONDITIONS AND STIPULATIONS
Definition of Terms
The fo"owmg terms when used m m-s policy me»o
(at tnsu^ed the insured named «n Schedule A ana subject to any ngnts or
efenses tr« Company may nave nao against the named insured mose who
ucceed to tne interest of such ."•sured bv ooerat'on o< law as oisnnouisned from
lurcnase including out not Urr ted to ne«rs distnouiees devisees survivors
ie'sonai representatives neit of *m or corporate or fiduciary successors
(D) insured claimant an insured cta>ming loss or damage nereunoe'
<ci Knowledge actual Knowledge not constructive *now<edge O' notice
vhicn may oe imputed to an insured by reason o< any pudnc records
id) land the land descr.oed soecrf'cafiy or by reference m Schedule A and
morovements affixed thereto which Dy <aw constitute real property provided
however me term land does not include any property beyonc the imes of the
irea specifically descnoed or referred to m Schedule A nor any ngnt title
nterest estate or easement <r abutting streets roaos avenues alleys tanes wavs
3* ^ate-^ays Out notnmg nerem snai '-odify or limit the extent to which a ngnt of
access to ano f'om me iano is msuied Ov this policy
<e) mortgage
mortgage deed of trust trust deed or other security
nsuumen*
(t) public records tnose records wnicn by law tmoart constructive notice of
matters relating to said iana
2. Continuation of Insurance after Conveyance of Tide
The ccverageof m-s pot'Cy shall continue m force as of Oateof Policy m favor of
an insured so long as sucn insured retains an estate or interest m the 'and or noios
an indebtedness "secured by a ourcnase money mortgage given by a ou'enaser
from such insured or so long as such insured shall have iiaoiiity by reason of
covenants of warranty made by such insured m any transfer or conveyance of
such estate or interest provided however tnispot'Cy shall not continue m force m
favor o< an/ purchaser from such insured o< either said estate or interest or the
indebtedness secured by a purchase money mortgage given to such insured
3. Defense and Prosecution of Actions — Notice of Claim to be Given by an
insured Claimant
(at The Company at its own cost and without undue delay shall provide for the
defense of so insured m ail litigation consisting of actions or proceedings
commenced agamst such insured to the extent that such litigation is founded
upon an alleged defect lien encumbrance or other matter insured against by this
policy

(bi The insured shall notify the Comoany promptly m writing (o m case an
action or proceed * - is begun as set forth in (aiaoove lnMncasexnowteogesna
come to an msurte'eunoer o< any claim of title or interest which <s adverse t
me titie to me est* ^r interest as insured ano which mioht cause lossor damag
•or wmch me Con- -y may be liable by virtue of this poucy it such prompt none
shan not oe give' z me Company men as to sucn insured aft liability of tr
Company shau Cf-*-» and terminate m reqard to me matter o' matters tor wmc
sucn prompt no*'CP s recused provided nowever that fa u<e ro notify snaiim r
case prejudice fne ngnts ot any such insured unoer m»s policy unless tr
Company snaii oe prejudiced by sucn failure and then on»v to the extent of su<
prejudice
(O The Comoany snaii nave the rignt at its own cost to institute and wctho
undue delay prosecute any action or proceeding or to 00 any other act which m i
oomion may be necessary or desirable to establish me title to me estate or inter*
as insured ano me Company may tane any appropriate action under the terms
this policy whether or not it snail be liable thereunder and snail not there'
concede uabiiny or waive any provision ot this poucy
(d) Whenever me Company snail have brought any action or interposed
defense as required or permitted by the provisions of this policy the Ccmpa
may pursue any such litigation to tmai determination py a court of compet«
jurisdiction and exoressiy reserves tne right in its soie discretion to apoeai frc
any adverse judgment or order
fe> in an cases where this ooiicy permits or reouires.tne Company to proseci
or provide for me defense of any action or proceeding the insured hereunder sfi
secure to the Comoany me ngnt to so orosecute or provide defense «n such acti
or proceeding and at' aopeais therein ana permit me Company to use at
ootion me name of sucn insured for such purpose Whenever requested by 1
Company such insured snail give the Comoany an reasonable aid m any si.
action or proceeding m effecting settlement securing evidence obtain
witnesses or prosecuting or defending such action or proceeding ancj
Company shall reimburse such insured tor any expense so incurred
4. Notice of Loss—Limitation of Action
in addition to the notices required under paragraph 3 fb) of these Conditu
and Stipulations a statement m writing of any toss or damage for which i
claimed the Company is liable under this policy snail be furnished to me Compi
within 90 days after sucn loss or damage snail have oeen determined and no n
of action shall accrue to an insured claimant until 30 days after such statem
shau have been furnished failure to furnish such statement of loss or dam,
shall terminate any liability of the Company under this policy as to such tost
damage

Continued on cover sheet
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY,
BRUER-HARRISON, INC., CASPER
J. BREUER and WILLIAM M.
HARRISON,

feTAT^O^

;
]
]

Plaintiffs,

\

RULING ON MOTIONS

;

vs.

]

KEITH P. COMBE, EVELYN COMBE
ROBERT E. FROERER, ATTORNEYS
TITLE GUARANTY FUNDING, and
FIRST SECURITY BANK, N.A.,
Trustee,

|

fN

]
!

Case No.

90135 .

Case No.

907 93

Defendants.
KEITH P. COMBE, EVELYN COMBE,
and FIRST SECURITY BANK, N.A.,
OGDEN, UTAH, as Trustee for
PHILIP COMBE,

]
]
]
]

Plaintiffs,

)

vs.
CASPER J. BREUER and
WILLIAM M. HARRISON,

)

Defendants.

The
Paragraph

parties

8 of which

entered
states,

into

a

Real

Estate

Contract,

"Seller warrants that there are no

liens or encumbrances on the property herein above described, and
agrees
showing

to furnish
good

to Buyer,

and marketable

at Sellers
title

expense,

in said

a title policy

property

(said

title

policy to be furnished at the time of the receipt of down payment

i "P"
1
Ai nut 1 o

^ * a..3?.Di

Page 2
Ruling on Motions
Case No. 90135
from Buyer).

Further, Seller agrees to execute and deliver to

Buyer, or assigns, good and sufficient warranty

deeds covering

title to the above described property when subdivided and as paid
for in accordance with the terms hereinabove set out."
(In regard to the sellers claim that Paragraph 5 makes
it an "as is" sale, without warranties, I hold that Paragraph 5
is speaking of the physical condition of the property, and has
nothing to do with the warranties of title as set out Paragraph
8.)

The original contract was dated January 9, 1980.

It was

amended four times, but at no time was Paragraph 8 altered and
the amendments stated and all other terms and conditions shall
remain the same.
It turns out

that there

is a 30

foot wide

easement

traversing the property diagonally in a northwest direction and
in the easement is an irrigation aqueduct of substantial size.
The easement

is not listed

in the Real Estate Contract as an

exception to Paragraph 8.
There is argument

between the parties as to when the

buyers knew of the easement; sellers claiming they knew all along
and buyers claiming they knew sometime in 1983.

The buyers claim

that the sellers committed an anticipatory breach of contract, in
that they are now and will always be unable to supply a warranty
deed free of the easement.

The sellers make no claim that they

can relieve the property of the easement by having the pipeline

Page 3
Ruling on Motions
Case No. 90135

changed.

Admittedly,

their contract.

they

cannot

comply

with

Paragraph

8 of

I find that the doctrine of anticipatory breach

is applicable in this case, as the sellers are unable to perform
their

obligation

under

unencumbered

title

easement

not

is

to

the

the

a minor

contract

buyers.

to

convey

I further

inconvenience,

but

fee

find

is a

simple,
that

the

substantial

encumbrance to fee title.
I further

find that waiver

is not a defense to their

inability to perform.
There are various remedies for anticipatory breach, and
the buyer is not required to immediately make an election or be
held to waive his right to rescind the contract.

The purchaser

is entitled to a deed which conveys the fee simple title to the
land without the easement and is not required to accept a defective title.

The Glasmann case cited by both parties, which has

stood for 80 years, rather hits the nail on the head, wherein it
states, "The respondent contracted to furnish a good title, and
the fact that he was unable to do so is his misfortune, and not
the fault of the appellant."
The contract being subject to rescission, the buyer may
be entitled to some refund of payments.

If the parties cannot

arrive at an agreement between themselves, they are instructed to
contact

the

calendar

clerk

and

have

the

matter

set

for

an

evidentiary hearing.

47
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The

buyers 1

motion

for

summary

judgment

seeking

rescission is granted.
Whereas
rescission
action

ends

for

the
the

ruling
contract

foreclosure

falls

granting
between
of

its

motion for summary judgment dismissing

summary

the

judgment

parties,

own

weight.

for

the

sellers

The

buyers'

the sellers complaint for

foreclosure is granted.
The buyers1 counsel to prepare findings, conclusions and
judgment in accordance herewith.
DATED this

/ rf day of March, 1986.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this
true

and

correct

copy

of

the

I ; day of March, 1986, a

foregoing

Ruling

served upon the following:

Jack

L.

Schoenhdls

Attorney for Bruer-Harrison
721 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Dtah 84101
Erik Strindberg
Attorney for Defendants Combe
424 East Fifth South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

on

Motions

was

James 2. Davis
Attorney for Defendant First Security Bank
1020 First Security Bank Building
Ogden, Utah 84401
David C. West
1300 Walker Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Jeffry R. Burton
2606 Washington Boulevard
Ogden, Utah 84401

PAULA CARR, Secretary

KA;

- n'ra

'-,/.:::l;
Ls

Jack L. Schoenhals #2881
Attorney for Plaintiff
721 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: 363-8823

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
BREUER-HARRISON, INC., CASPER
J. BREUER AND WILLIAM M.
HARRISON,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

fl

Plaintiffs,
Civil No. 90135
vs.
KEITH P. COMBE, EVELYN COMBE,
ROBERT A. FROERER, ATTORNEYS
TITLE GUARANTY FUND, AND
FIRST SECURITY BANK, N.A. ,
TRUSTEE,
Defendants.
KEITH P. COMBE, EVELYN COMBE,
AND FIRST SECURITY BANK, N.A.,
OGDEN, UTAH, AS TRUSTEE FOR
PHILIP COMBE,

C i v i l No. 90793

Plaintiffs,
vs.
CASPER J. BREUER AND
WILLIAM M. HARRISON,
Defendants.
The
before

a b o v e - e n t i t l e d m a t t e r came on r e g u l a r l y for
the

Honorable

hearing

R o n a l d 0. Hyde, one of t h e Judges of

EXHIBIT D

the
of

above-entitled
December,

were

Defendants,
represented
Froerer,

this

by

P.

John

was

First

the

Memorandums

the

by

Ashton,

L.

and

the

the

Breuer

Jack

Schoenhals,

Robert

West,

reviewed the f i l e s

Title

and

and r e c o r d s
and

R u l i n g on M o t i o n s ,

the

in

having

t o t h e C o u r t and h a v i n g r e v i e w e d
its

E.

by J a m e s Z.

and h a v i n g h e a r d a r g u m e n t of c o u n s e l
submitted

were

t h e Defendant

David

the

Combe,

Bank was r e p r e s e n t e d

having

Plaintiffs,

Defendant,

by

day

a n d W i l l i a m M.

Evelyn

or r e p r e s e n t e d ,

represented

and having e n t e r e d

enters

J.

Combe

Security

Court

matter

same

Keith

2:00 p . m . ,

Casper

represented

Fund

Defendant
Davis,

Inc.,

was n o t p r e s e n t

Guaranty

i n h i s c o u r t r o o m on t h e 1 9 t h

1 9 8 5 , a t t h e h o u r of

Breaer-Harrison,
Harrison,

Court,

the

now makes and

following:
FINDINGS OF FACT

1.

Casper

buyers;
Bank,

2.

Breuer

and

Trustee,

dated January
Pursuant

as s e l l e r s ,
9,

M.

Harrison,

entered

t o t h e t e r m s of

Security

into a real

the real e s t a t e

estate

the real e s t a t e

-2-

contract,

$75,000.00.

A-L i-riie Lime of t h e p u r c h a s e of

e-jt<iuu LTtra—of

as

1980.

t h e b u y e r s made a down payment of
3.

William

and K e i t h P. Combe, E v e l y n Combe, and F i r s t

N.A. ,

contract

J.

contract,

t h e p r o p e r t y and

the

the s e l l e r s

for

paid

a policy

of

t i t l e i n s u r a n c e , which was i s s u e d t o t h e buyers

as i n s u r e d s .
4.

The b u y e r s

amendments
terms

and

to

the

sellers

estate

entered

amendments

though

to

the

8 of

amendments
conditions

the

real

the

of

the

buyers

and

estate

real

provided

The r e a l

execute

".

s e l l e r s entered

contract,

estate

that

real

7.
the

estate

and d e l i v e r

sufficient

at

to

the

into

no time was

c o n t r a c t a l t e r e d and t h e
.

. all

other

terms

and

e s t a t e c o n t r a c t d a t e d December 29,
effect."

c o n t r a c t requires the s e l l e r s
the

buyers

or

to

a s s i g n s , good and

There

is

a 30 f o o t

wide easement which

traverses

d i a g o n a l l y in a n o r t h w e s t d i r e c t i o n and w i t h i n

t h a t easement i s an i r r i g a t i o n aquaduct of s u b s t a n t i a l

in

the

w a r r a n t y deeds c o v e r i n g t i t l e of t h e p r o p e r t y .

property

8.

four

c o n t r a c t which a l t e r e d

1979 s h a l l remain t h e same and in f u l l f o r c e and
6.

into

contract.

Even

paragraph

real

the

c o n d i t i o n s of t h e payments due under t h e terms of

the real e s t a t e
5.

and

The easement and t h e aquaduct a r e n e i t h e r
real

obligations

size.

described

estate

c o n t r a c t nor a r e they e x c e p t e d from t h e

of

sellers

the

to

convey good and

sufficient

w a r r a n t y deeds f r e e and c l e a r of l i e n s and encumbrances.

-3-

9.
not
in

The e x i s t e n c e of t h e easement and t h e aquaduct were

disclosed
the

by t h e s e l l e r s t o t h e b u y e r s , were not noted

r e a l e s t a t e c o n t r a c t , or shown as an e x c e p t i o n in t h e

p o l i c y of t i t l e
10.

In

insurance issued to the buyers.
the

first

part

of

the

year

1983,

Combes

disclosed

t h e e x i s t e n c e of t h e easement t o t h e b u y e r s 1

at

time

which

a new t i t l e

report

was p r e s e n t e d

agent
to the

b u y e r s 1 a g e n t which d i s c l o s e d t h e e x i s t e n c e of t h e easement.
11.
which

T h e r e i s a d i s p u t e of f a c t as t o t h e e x a c t d a t e a t

the

buyers

became

aware

of

the

existence

of

the

easement and became aware of t h e e x i s t e n c e of t h e a q u a d u c t .
12.
the

P a r a g r a p h 5 of t h e r e a l e s t a t e c o n t r a c t

p h r a s e "as i s " p e r t a i n s t o t h e p h y s i c a l c o n d i t i o n of

property

and has n o t h i n g t o do with t h e w a r r a n t i e s of

which

are

estate

contract.

13.
relieve

dealt

The
the

14.

The

estate

the
title

w i t h s e p a r a t e l y in p a r a g r a p h 8 of t h e

sellers
property

have
of

made

no c l a i m

that

t h e y can

property.

s e l l e r s cannot comply with p a r a g r a p h 8 of
contract

real

t h e easement a n d / o r t h a t they can

have t h e p i p e l i n e removed from t h e

real

containing

and

c a n n o t convey t i t l e t o t h e

p r o p e r t y f r e e and c l e a r of t h e easement and t h e a q u a d u c t .

-4-

the
real

15.
not

The e x i s t e n c e of t h e easement and t h e aquaduct

a minor

inconvenience

but

is

instead

a

is

substantial

encumbrance t o t h e fee t i t l e t o t h e p r o p e r t y .
16.
the

The

buyers

in f u l l

s e l l e r s were not o b l i g a t e d t o convey t i t l e

u n t i l t h e buyers made payment of t h e b a l a n c e due

to the s e l l e r s .

17.

At no t i m e ,

hearing

of

this

balance

of

the

simple

fee

of

19.

contract

t h e buyers t e n d e r t h e

the

entire

and demand conveyance of the

the

real

estate

the

property,

to

fee

convey

terms

fee

easement
further

b e c a u s e they cannot comply with t h e
c o n t r a c t and convey unencumbered
a r e g u i l t y of an a n t i c i p a t o r y

contract.

Since

the

t h e s e l l e r s cannot perform t h e i r
of

title,

and

the

Real

Estate

Contract

obligation
and cannot

by w a r r a n t y deed, f r e e and c l e a r of

aquaduct,

obligation

to

the

buyers

are

relieved

the

of any

p e r f o r m under t h e terms of t h e

real

contract.

20.
which

and i n c l u d i n g t h e d a t e of

did

sellers,

breach of t h e

estate

motion,

The

title

under

up t o

title.

18.
terms

to

There

indicates

anticipatory

is

no c o n d u c t

that

breach

the
as

on t h e

buyers

part

elected

of t h e buyers
to

treat

a breach of t h e c o n t r a c t u n t i l

•5-

the
the

buyers

filed

l e g a l a c t i o n and a l l e g e d t h a t t h e s e l l e r s were

g u i l t y of an a n t i c i p a t o r y
21.

The b u y e r s

substantial
their
the

period

made
of

a substantial

effort,

over a

t i m e , t o see if t h e y could m i t i g a t e

damages a n d / o r m i t i g a t e t h e impact of t h e easement and

aquaduct

hired

breach.

upon

the

property,

and in t h i s r e g a r d ,

t h e s e r v i c e s of v a r i o u s e n g i n e e r s and examined

alternative

methods

easement and t h e
22.
easement

of

several

d e v e l o p i n g t h e p r o p e r t y around t h e

aquaduct.

The b u y e r s became a w a r e , t h a t t h e e x i s t e n c e of
and

they

the

aquaduct

i n t e r f e r e d with t h e i r

the

proposed

development of t h e p r o p e r t y .
23 .
maps

The easement was not shown on any s k e t c h e s or p l a t

given

to

purchased the
24.
drawings
new t i t l e

The

the

buyers

prior

to

the

time

that

they

property.
first

prepared
report

time

the

easement

was

shown

on any

by Great Basin E n g i n e e r i n g was a f t e r
was g i v e n

the

by t h e s e l l e r s t o - h e b u y e r s 1

a g e n t in 1 9 8 3 .
25.
condition

The
as

real
it

property

remains

in t h e same p h y s i c a l

was when t h e o r i g i n a l r e a l e s t a t e

was e x e c u t e d between t h e b u y e r s and t h e
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sellers.

contract

26.

The b u y e r s made a t i m e l y

anticipatory
contract.

b r e a c h of the c o n t r a c t , and/or to rescind the

After the buyers made t h e i r e l e c t i o n to claim an

anticipatory

breach

filing

action,

legal

engaged
their

e l e c t i o n to claim an

and/or

t h e c o n t r a c t , by

t h e r e i s no evidence t h a t the buyers

in any c o n d u c t

right

to r e s c i n d

to e l e c t

which could c o n s t i t u t e a waiver of

to act

upon the a n t i c i p a t o r y breach

and/or to rescind the c o n t r a c t .
27.
sellers

The q u e s t i o n

of

the

refund

to

t o t h e buyers i s a q u e s t i o n of f a c t .

cannot

arrive

amount

to

refund

will

at

future date after
The c o u r t

by t h e

If t h e p a r t i e s

an agreement between t h e m s e l v e s as t o t h e

be r e f u n d e d ,
have

be p a i d

to

the

q u e s t i o n of t h e amount of

be r e s e r v e d

an e v i d e n t i a r y

for

the

d e t e r m i n a t i o n at a

hearing.

h a v i n g made and e n t e r e d i t s F i n d i n g s of Fact

now makes and e n t e r s t h e

following:

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1.
of

The s e l l e r s

the r e a l

estate

a r e unable to perform under the terms
contract

and convey unencumbered fee

simple t i t l e to the buyers.
2.

The easement and the aquaduct contained within the

easement c o n s t i t u t e a s u b s t a n t i a l encumbrance to fee t i t l e .
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3.
under

The b u y e r s are r e l i e v e d of any further
the

terms

of

the r e a l

estate

obligations

c o n t r a c t and/or are

e n t i t l e d to a r e s c i s i o n of the r e a l e s t a t e c o n t r a c t .
4.

The buyers did not waive t h e i r r i g h t to require the

sellers

to perform under

the

terms

of

the

real

estate

contract.
5.

Waiver

sellers

of

the r i g h t

of the buyers to require the

t o p e r f o r m and/or to rescind the c o n t r a c t i s not a

d e f e n s e to the s e l l e r s ' i n a b i l i t y to perform under the f a c t s
of t h i s c a s e .
6.

After

anticipatory
relieved

of

terms

the

filing
the

of

breach

of

the c o n t r a c t

and t o s e e k to be

the o b l i g a t i o n of further performance under the
contract

and/or

t o rescind the c o n t r a c t , by

l e g a l a c t i o n , there is no evidence of any conduct on

part

their

t h e b u y e r s elected to act upon the s e l l e r s '

of

right

relieved

of

t h e b u y e r s which would c o n s t i t u t e a waiver of
to r e q u i r e
further

the

sellers

t o perform, or to be

o b l i g a t i o n under the terms of the r e a l

e s t a t e c o n t r a c t and/or to rescind the c o n t r a c t .
7.

The buyers are e n t i t l e d to a deed which conveys fee

s i m p l e u n e n c u m b e r e d t i t l e to the land without the easement
and t h e a q u a d u c t
defective

and the buyers are not required to accept

title.
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8.

The r e a l

convey

fee

demonstrates

estate

simple,
good

contract

r e q u i r e s the s e l l e r s

unencumbered

title

which

to

title

and m a r k e t a b l e t i t l e , f r e e and c l e a r of

t h e e x i s t e n c e of t h e easement and t h e a q u a d u c t .
9.
parties

The a m e n d m e n t s

entered

do n o t

the

relieve

into

sellers

by and between t h e
of the o b l i g a t i o n

to

convey fee simple unencumbered t i t l e t o t h e b u y e r s .
10 .

The

M

as i s " p r o v i s i o n s c o n t a i n e d in p a r a g r a p h 5 of

the

r e a l e s t a t e c o n t r a c t r e l a t e t o t h e p h y s i c a l c o n d i t i o n of

the

p r o p e r t y and have n o t h i n g t o do with w a r r a n t i e s of

as s e t f o r t h in p a r a g r a p h 8 of t h e r e a l e s t a t e
11.

The

relieve

the

sellers

have

made no c l a i m

title

contract.
that

t h e y can

p r o p e r t y of t h e easement by having t h e easement

and t h e p i p e l i n e changed or removed.
12.
in

The d o c t r i n e of a n t i c i p a t o r y breach i s

this

case

obligation

and

the

under

sellers
the

applicable

a r e u n a b l e to perform

contract

to

convey

fee

their
simple

unencumbered t i t l e t o t h e b u y e r s .
13.

The b u y e r s

available
contract

arising
by t h e

immediately
breach

had

out

several

of

the

sellers.

alternative

remedies

a n t i c i p a t o r y breach of

The buyers 'were not r e q u i r e d

make an e l e c t i o n t o a c t upon t h e

to

anticipatory

of t h e c o n t r a c t , or t o seek t o be r e l i e v e d of
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the

further

obligation
and/or

to

to

perform

under

the

terms

of

the

contract,

r e s c i n d t h e c o n t r a c t or t h e r e f o r e be h e l d to have

waived t h e i r r i g h t t o so a c t ,
14.

The Gla s s m a n

sellers

cited

by t h e

b u y e r s and t h e

" h i t s t h e n a i l on t h e head", wherein i t s t a t e s ,

respondent
that

case

c o n t r a c t e d to furnish

he was

f a u l t of t h e
15.

unable

a good t i t l e , and t h e

t o do so i s h i s m i s f o r t u n e ,

The

payments

fact

and not t h e

appellant."

The c o n t r a c t i s s u b j e c t t o

16.

"the

buyers

made.

If

rescision.

may be e n t i t l e d t o some refund of
the

parties

cannot

enter

into

the
an

a g r e e m e n t as t o t h e refund t o be made, t h e p a r t i e s a r e t o be
directed

to

request

a date

for

an e v i d e n t i a r y h e a r i n g so

t h a t t h e m a t t e r can be r e s o l v e d .
17.
the

A partial

buyers

perform

determining

that

judgment should be g r a n t e d
the

sellers

u n d e r t h e terms of t h e c o n t r a c t ,

obligated
contract,

to

18.

further

perform

under

are

unable

to
to

t h e buyers a r e not
the

terms

of

a n d / o r t h e buyers a r e e n t i t l e d t o r e s c i s i o n of

real estate

the
the

contract.
The f a c t t h a t t h e b u y e r s a r e e n t i t l e d t o a summary

judgment
under

summary

d e t e r m i n i n g t h a t t h e s e l l e r s a r e u n a b l e t o perform

the

terms

of

the

contract,
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the

buyers

are

not

obligated
contract,
ends

the

to

further

perform

under

the

terms

a n d / o r a r e e n t i t l e d t o r e s c i s i o n of t h e
contract

between

the

parties,

of

the

contract,

and t h e

sellers1

a c t i o n for f o r e c l o s u r e f a l l s of i t s own w e i g h t .
19.

A summary

the s e l l e r s '
20.
the

court

judgment

complaint for

A partial

dismissing

foreclosure.

summary

incorporating

s h o u l d be e n t e r e d

judgment should be e n t e r e d by

t h e d e c i s i o n of t h e c o u r t i n t o t h e

p a r t i a l summary judgment.
Dated t h i s

£_ day of A p r i l / J 1 9 8 6 .
COURT:

'f^ffiJi+dU
HYDE, "JUDGE

RONALD 0.
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I

mailed

Conclusions

a

copy

of

the foregoing

of Law t o t h e f o l l o w i n g

F i n d i n g s of

t h i s *>.!;«** day of

1986.

John P. Ashton
Erik Strindberg
Attorneys at Law
Third Floor Mony Plaza
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
James Z. Davis
Attorney at Law
1020 First Security Bank Bldg.
Ogden, Utah 84401
David C. West
Attorney at Law
1300 Walker Bank Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Bruce Maak
Attorney at Law
Suite 1300, 185 S. State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Jeffry R. Burton
Attorney at Law
2606 Washington Blvd.
Ogden, Utah 84401

vOv
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Fact

>\

w

and

M«&Sfv,

for G ! z:-?y%
.

/ -

Jack L. Schoenhals #2881
Attorney for Plaintiffs
721 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: 363-8823

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
BREUER-HARRISON, INC., CASPER
J. BREUER AND WILLIAM M.
HARRISON,

SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Civil NO. 90135

Plaintiffs,
vs
KEITH P. COMBE, EVELYN COMBE,
ROBERT A. FROERER, ATTORNEYS
TITLE GUARANTY FUND, AND
FIRST SECURITY BANK, N.A.,
TRUSTEE,
Defendants.
KEITH P. COMBE, EVELYN COMBE,
AND FIRST SECURITY BANK, N.A.,
OGDEN, UTAH, AS TRUSTEE FOR
PHILIP COMBE,

C i v i l No.

Plaintiffs,
vs.
CASPER J. BREUER AND
WILLIAM M. HARRISON,
Defendants.

EXHIBIT E.

90793

•\J

The

a b o v e - e n t i t l e d m a t t e r came on r e g u l a r l y for

before
the
of

the

Honorable

above-entitled
December,

Plaintiffs,

R o n a l d 0. Hyde, one of t h e Judges of

C o u r t , in h i s courtroom on t h e 19th day

1985,

at

t h e hour of 2:00 o ' c l o c k ,

E r e u e r -Har r i son ,

Inc.,

Defendants,

represented
Froerer,

Fund was

Defendant

this

by J o h n

P.

Combe and

Ashton,

the

First

the

represented

Security

Court

having

the

Evelyn

Schoenhals,
Combe,

Defendant,

by D a v i d

were

Robert

was not p r e s e n t or r e p r e s e n t e d , t h e Defendant

Guaranty

Davis,

Keith

p.m.,

Casper J . Breuer and

W i l l i a m M. H a r r i s o n , were r e p r e s e n t e d by Jack L.
the

hearing

West,

E.

Title

and

the

Bank was r e p r e s e n t e d by James Z.
reviewed t h e f i l e s and r e c o r d s

in

matter

and having heard argument of c o u n s e l and having

Memorandums

s u b m i t t e d t o t h e Court and having reviewed t h e

same

and having e n t e r e d i t s Ruling, on M o t i o n s , now makes and

enters the

following:

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as f o l l o w s :
1.
Breuer
be

and

The P l a i n t i f f s ,

the

I n c . , Casper J .

and William M. H a r r i s o n 1 s Motion for Summary Judgment
the

determined
and

Breuer-Harrison,

same
that

First

is

the

hereby

granted

and

it

is

hereby

s e l l e r s K e i t h P. Combe, Evelyn Combe,

S e c u r i t y Bank a r e u n a b l e t o perform under t h e
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terms

of

the

unencumbered
determined

Plaintiffs

the

under

effect

e s t a t e c o n t r a c t and a r e u n a b l e t o convey

fee simple t i t l e t o t h e b u y e r s .

that

obligations
The

real

of

buyers

the

the

are

terms

of

decision

of

relieved

Bank,
for

of

the

court

further

any

the real e s t a t e
is

further

contract.
to

a r e s c i s s i o n of t h e r e a l e s t a t e c o n t r a c t

i n t o by and between t h e s a i d P l a i n t i f f s
2.

It is

grant
entered

and D e f e n d a n t s .

K e i t h P. Combe, Evelyn Combe and The F i r s t

Security

N.A., Ogden Utah, as T r u s t e e for P h i l i p Combe's Motion

Summary Judgment a g a i n s t Casper J . Breuer and William M.

H a r r i s o n , be and t h e same i s hereby d e n i e d ,
3.

Breuer-Harrison,

M. H a r r i s o n
to

I n c . , Casper J . Breuer and William

may be e n t i t l e d t o some refund of payments made

K e i t h P. Combe, Evelyn Combe and The F i r s t S e c u r i t y Bank,

N.A.,

Ogden U t a h ,

First

S e c u r i t y Bank, N.A., Ogden Utah, as T r u s t e e for

Combe,

the

agreement

instructed

T r u s t e e for P h i l i p Combe.

As t o The
Philip

l i a b i l i t y may be l i m i t e d as p r o v i d e d in t h e Utah

Code A n n o t a t e d
an

as

75-7-306.

among

If t h e p a r t i e s cannot a r r i v e

themselves

as t o t h e r e f u n d ,

at

they a r e

t o c o n t a c t t h e c a l e n d a r c l e r k and have t h e m a t t e r

s e t for an e v i d e n t i a r y

hearing.
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<J

w?

Dated t h i s

h

day of AptilCj

/

^

1986.

BY T«£")COURT:
/

/

ROtfALD 0.

HYDE, JUDGE ' j
j

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I mailed a copy of the foregoing Summary Judgment to
the following this ^ T — day of April, 1986.
John P. Ashton
Erik Strindberg
Attorneys at Law
Third Floor Mony Plaza
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
James Z. Davis
Attorney at Law
1020 First Security Bank Bldg.
Ogden, Utah 84 401
David C. West
Attorney at Law
130 0 Walker Bank Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Bruce Maak
Attorney at Law
Suite 1300, 185 S. State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Jeffry R. Burton
Attorney at Law
2606 Washington Blvd.
Ogden, Utah 84401

97J7.
- c.V

Jack L. Schoenhals
,,-. j,V. "• V•'
t
Attorney for Breuer-Har^io-ri''
721 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone No. 363-8823

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND' FOR
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
BREUER-HARRISON, INC., CASPER
J. BREUER and WILLIAM M.
HARRISON,

ORDER AMENDING FINDINGS
OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF
LAW

A

Plaintiffs,
KEITH P. COMBE, EVELYN COMBE,
ROBERT E. FROERER, ATTORNEYS
TITLE GUARANTY FUNDING, and
FIRST SECURITY BANK, N.A.,
TRUSTEE,
Civil No. 090135
Defendants.

KEITH P. COMBE, EVELYN COMBE
AND FIRST SECURITY BANK, N.A.,
OGDEN, UTAH, as Trustee
for Philip Combe,
Plaintiffs,
CASPER J. BREUER AND
WILLIAM M. HARRISON,

C i v i l No. 90793

Defendants.

The
before
the

above-entitled
the

Honorable

above-entitled

m a t t e r came on r e g u l a r l y f o r

hearing

R o n a l d 0. Hyde, one of t h e J u d g e s of

Court,

in

his

courtroom,

EXHIBIT F

in C i t y ,
Ogdei

v

^£*

532

«i ° s
973
Weber
hour

County

Municipal

of 9:00 a . m . ,

Conclusions
Robert
First

E.

of

B u i l d i n g , on J u l y 10, 1986, a t t h e

on O b j e c t i o n s t o t h e F i n d i n g s of F a c t and

Law f i l e d

Froerer,

by K e i t h P. Combe, Evelyn Combe,

Attorneys

Title

G u a r a n t y Funding and

S e c u r i t y Bank, N.A. ; B r e u e r - H a r r i s o n ,

Breuer

I n c . , Casper J .

and W i l l i a m M. H a r r i s o n were r e p r e s e n t e d by Jack L.

S c h o e n h a l s , K e i t h P. Combe and Evelen Combe were r e p r e s e n t e d
by J o h n

P.

Ashton,

Theodore

E.

by D a v i d

West,

represented,
in

Robert

E.

Froerer

was r e p r e s e n t e d by

K a n e l l , T i t l e Guaranty Funding was r e p r e s e n t e d
First

S e c u r i t y Bank was n e i t h e r p r e s e n t

nor

t h e Court having reviewed t h e f i l e s and r e c o r d s

t h i s c a s e and having heard argument of c o u n s e l , now makes

and e n t e r s t h e

following:

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows.:
1.
of

Fact

The f o l l o w i n g
dated

May 6 ,

numbered p a r a g r a p h s of t h e F i n d i n g s
1986,

a r e hereby amended t o read as

follows:
3.

The

insurance,

Sellers
which

paid

was

insureds.
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for

issued

a p o l i c y of
to

the

title

Buyers

as

97&

4.

The B u y e r s and S e l l e r s entered into four

amendments t o t h e r e a l
altered

the terms

due u n d e r

estate

contract

which

and conditions of the payments

t h e t e r m s of the r e a l e s t a t e c o n t r a c t .

The d a t e s the four amendments were executed are as
follows:

11/24/82;

1/3/83;

and two amendments

were executed on 2/26/84.
9.

Prior

the easement

t o the year 1983, the existence of
and t h e aquaduct were not d i s c l o s e d

by t h e S - e l l e r s

t o t h e Buyers, were not noted in

t h e r e a l e s t a t e c o n t r a c t , or shown as an exception
on t h e p o l i c y

of t i t l e

i n s u r a n c e issued to the

Buyers.
12.

P a r a g r a p h 12 of the Findings of Fact i s

h e r e b y determined to be a Conclusion of Law and i s
hereby adopted

by t h e C o u r t

as a Conclusion of

Law.
16.

P a r a g r a p h 16 of the Findings of Fact i s

h e r e b y determined to be a Conclusion of Law and is
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1

1 n

, -: • 950
hereby

adopted

by t h e

Court

as a C o n c l u s i o n of

Law.
18.

P a r a g r a p h 18 of t h e F i n d i n g s of F a c t

is

h e r e b y d e t e r m i n e d t o be a Conclusion of Law and i s
hereby

adopted

by t h e

Court

a s a C o n c l u s i o n of

Law.
19.

P a r a g r a p h 19 of t h e F i n d i n g s of F a c t

is

h e r e b y d e t e r m i n e d t o be a Conclusion of Law and i s
hereby

adopted

by t h e

Court

a s a C o n c l u s i o n of

Law.
21.
over

The B u y e r s

made a s u b s t a n t i a l

effort-,

a s u b s t a n t i a l p e r i o d of t i m e , t o see if

could
impact

mitigate

t h e i r damages a n d / o r m i t i g a t e

they
the

of

the

e a s e m e n t and t h e aquaduct upon t h e

property,

and

in

this

regard,

they

hired

s e r v i c e s of v a r i o u s e n g i n e e r s and examined
alternative
around
time

the
that

methods

of

the

several

d e v e l o p i n g the property

easement and t h e aquaduct p r i o r t o t h e
they

filed

-4-

legal

action

and

were

I'

•

')

,-/

931....
justified

in

d e l a y i n g t h e f i l i n g of l e g a l

u n t i l they made t h a t
27.
be

by

the

an a g r e e m e n t
be

if

determination

2.

The

Conclusions

the

Buyers,

is

If t h e p a r t i e s cannot a r r i v e

t h e q u e s t i o n of t h e amount of

any,

evidentiary

to

if any,

to
a
at

b e t w e e n t h e m s e l v e s as t o t h e amount

refunded,

refund,

of t h e r e f u n d ,

Sellers

q u e s t i o n of f a c t .

to

effort,

The q u e s t i o n

paid

action

will
at

have
a

to

the

be r e s e r v e d for a

future

date

after

an

paragraphs

of

hearing.
following

numbered

the

of Law d a t e d May 6, 1986, a r e hereby amended t o

read as f o l l o w s :
11.

Paragraph

11 of t h e C o n c l u s i o n s of Law

is

hereby

d e t e r m i n e d t o be a F i n d i n g of F a c t and

is

hereby

adopted

by t h e

Court

as a F i n d i n g of

Fact.
3-

Except

as

provided

herein

by t h i s

Order, which

modifies

a n d amends t h e F i n d i n g s of Fact and C o n c l u s i o n s of

Law,

other

all

Objections

-5-

made by t h e

parties

to

the

- L 0> w'

9S2.
i

Findings
herein,

of

Fact

a n d C o n c l u s i o n s of Law, e x c e p t a s

a r e h e r e b y o v e r r u l e d and

Dated t h i s

2> 0

granted

denied.

day of J u l y ,

1986.

BY THE ""COURT
RONALD 0. HYDE, JUDGE

f^
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Jack. L. Schoenhals (#2881)
Attorney for Plaintiffs
1200 Beneficial Life Tower
3 6 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 538-2344

SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
BREUER-HARRISON, INC., CASPER
J. BREUER AND WILLIAM M.
HARRISON,

SECOND REVISED
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiffs,
Civil No. 090135
vs.
KEITH P. COMBE, EVELYN COMBE,
ROBERT E. FROERER, ATTORNEYS
TITLE GUARANTY FUNDING, AND
FIRST SECURITY BANK, N.A.,
TRUSTEE,
KEITH P. COMBE, EVELYN COMBE
AND FIRST SECURITY BANK, N.A.,
OGDEN, UTAH, as Trustee for
CLAIR C. COMBE,
Plaintiffs,

Civil No. 90793

vs
CASPER J. BREUER AND WILLIAM
M. HARRISON,
Defendants.
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for trial
commencing on September 22, 1987, at 9:30 a.m., before the
Honorable Ronald

0. Hyde, District Judge, on the limited

EXHIBIT G-

i

issues of the total amount of payments made by Plaintiffs to
the

Defendants

Keith

P.

Combe,

Evelyn

Combe

and

First

Security Bank, N".A. , Ogden Utah, as Trustee for Clair C.
Combe, and the amount of restitution and/or refund to be paid
by the Defendants Keith P. Combe, Evelyn Combe, and Clair C.
Combe

(substituted party for First Security Bank), to the

Plaintiffs,
regarding

the

Court

having

determined

that

the

issues

the claims of the Plaintiffs against Robert E.

Froerer and the Attorneys Title Guaranty Fund were to have
been severed and tried at a subsequent date, and the said
parties not being present, but their counsel being present to
observe

the

participate
Harrison

proceedings,
in

being

the

but

not

proceedings,

present

and

having

being

the
been

permitted

Plaintiff
sworn

and

to

William
having

given testimony, and being represented by Jack L. Schoenhals,
the Defendants Keith P. Combe and Evelyn Combe having been
present and having been sworn and having given testimony, and
being represented by John Ashton and Erik Strindberg; the
interests of Clair C. Combe being represented by counsel for
Keith P. Combe and Evelyn Combe; the parties having called
additional witnesses who were sworn and having introduced
testimony and evidence, and the Court having received the
same, both the Plaintiffs and the Defendants Keith P. Combe
2

1 2 31

and Evelyn Combe having rested their case, and the matter
having been fully argued and presented before the Court, and
the

Court

having

granted

the

Plaintiffs'

Motion

for

a

Directed Verdict and for a Judgment, the Court now makes and
enters the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The Plaintiffs, Casper J. Breuer and William M.

Harrison as buyers; and Keith P. Combe, Evelyn Combe, and
First Security Bank, N.A., Trustee, as sellers, entered into
a Real Estate Contract dated December 29, 1979.
2.

Pursuant to the terms of the Real Estate Contract,

the buyers (Plaintiffs) paid the sum of $75,000.00 as a down
payment.
3.

The

buyers

and

the

sellers

entered

into

four

amendments to the real estate contract which altered the
terms and conditions of the payments due under the terms of
the real estate contract, but in all other respects, the Real
Estate Contract remained in full force and effect.
4.
execute

The Real Estate Contract required the sellers to
and

deliver

to the buyers

or assigns, good

and

sufficient warranty deeds covering title to the property.
5.
sufficient

The

sellers were unable to convey

warranty

deeds unencumbered
3

by good and

title to the real

property described

in the Real Estate Contract.

In this

regard there is a 30 foot wide easement which traverses the
property diagonally in a northwest direction and within that
easement is an irrigation aqueduct of substantial size.
6.

The easement and aqueduct are neither described in

the Real

Estate Contract nor are they

obligations

excepted

of the sellers to convey good and

from the
sufficient

warranty deeds free and clear of liens and encumbrances.
7.
could

The Court previously determined that the sellers

not

convey

by

good

and

sufficient

warranty

deeds

unencumbered title to the real property described in the Real
Estate Contract and could not comply with paragraph S of the
Real Estate Contract and could not convey title to the real
property free and clear of the easement and aqueduct.
8.
and

The Court previously determined that the easement

aqueduct were not a minor inconvenience, but instead

constituted a substantial encumbrance to the fee title to the
property.
9.

The Court previously determined that the buyers were

relieved of any further obligation to perform under the terms
of the Real Estate Contract.
10.

The Plaintiffs made the payments required under the

terms of the Real Estate Contract for the years 1980, 1981,
4

1982, and 1983.
11.

In the year

1983, the Defendant Keith P. Combe

desired to borrow money against the balance due on the Real
Estate Contract, and came to the Plaintiffs for permission to
borrow against the equity of the Combes, and in the process,
provided a Title Report to the Plaintiffs which showed that
there

was

an

property.

easement

which

ran

diagonally

across

the

The Plaintiffs made inquiry and investigation into

the status of the property and confirmed the existence of the
easement.
12.

The Plaintiffs asked their engineering

investigate

the

impact

of the easement

and

to

firms to
determine

whether or not the easement would prohibit or substantially
interfere with the development of the property.
13.

For

the

next

several

months

thereafter,

the

Plaintiffs investigated various alternative ways to overcome
the effect of the easement and to see if it was possible for
them

to

retain

the

property

and

develop

the

property

profitably, notwithstanding the existence of the easement.
14.

The Plaintiffs made a substantial effort, over a

substantial period of time, to see if they could mitigate
their damages and/or mitigate the impact of the easement and
the aqueduct upon the property, and
5

in this regard, they

hired

the

services

of

engineers

and

examined

alternative

methods of developing the property around the easement and
aqueduct, but concluded that it was not possible to develop
the property profitably given the purchase price, the cost of
engineering and expenses necessary to overcome the easement
and the aqueduct and the loss of market value of the lots as
a result of the existence of the easement and the burdens
associated with the easement.
15.

The easement was subject to several burdens and

requirements which included the following:
a.
concrete

The necessity

of placing some form of

bridging

strain

or

relief

over

the

aqueduct before a road could be constructed over
the aqueduct, the cost of which made the placement
of

a

road

over

the

aqueduct

too

expensive

to

reasonably consider for development purposes.
b.

The

right

of

access

remaining

in the

conservancy district to repair or replace the line.
c.

The

obligation

of

the

cost

of

the

restoration of the surface, after replacement or
repair, being placed upon the owner of fee title to
the land.
16.

The Plaintiffs met with the Combes for the purpose
6

of attempting to resolve their differences to see if the
Combes would reduce the purchase price so that they could
make the development of the property a profitable venture,
but the Defendant Keith P. Combe advised the Plaintiffs that
he would not be willing to reduce the purchase price.
17.

On

October

1,

1984, the

Plaintiffs

filed

this

action seeking alternative remedies against the Combes and
other parties.
18.

The

Plaintiffs

subsequently

filed

a Motion

for

Summary Judgment in which they requested a rescission of the
Real Estate Contract.
19.

The Court awarded the Plaintiffs a Summary Judgment

and determined

that the Defendants were unable to convey

title as promised in the Real Estate Contract and the Court
determined that Plaintiffs were entitled to terminate the
Contract, have

an Order

of Rescission

entered,

and

were

entitled to a refund.
20.

The

Court

directed

the

parties

to

attempt

to

resolve, between themselves, the amount of the refund to be
paid, and if they could not resolve the matter to come back
to the Court for an evidentiary hearing on the amount of the
refund to be paid to the Plaintiffs.
21.

The parties could not resolve the matter between
7

themselves and the case was set for trial.
22.

The Plaintiffs were unable to locate one or more

cancelled

checks

demonstrating

payments

of

principal

and

interest to the Combes and First Security Bank, as trustee
for Clair C. Combe, and although the Plaintiffs claimed that
they

had

made

total

contract

payments

in

the

$217,575.25, the Plaintiffs and Defendants entered

sum

of

into a

Stipulation that the Defendants would stipulate and agree and
the Plaintiffs were willing to stipulate and agree that they
had

paid

the

total

sum

of

$216,069.69

in

payments

of

principal and interest and the additional sum of $15,133.00
for real estate taxes for a total agreed upon payment by the
Plaintiffs to the Defendants of principal, interest and taxes
in the sum of $231,202.00.
23.

The accrued interest on the payments from the date

the payments were made to and including December 1, 1937, is
in the sum of $132,595.72, and the accrued interest on the
payments made on the taxes is in the sum of $596.92 for a
total of $133,192.64 prejudgment interest at the rate of 6%
per annum from the date of the payments to and including May
14, 1981 and at the rate of 10% per annum from the date of
the payments to and
additional

interest

including
to

March

December
1,
8

1988

1, 19 87,
is

in

the

and the
sum

of

$5,764.21, for a total judgment, together with interest in
the sum of $370,158.85.
24.

Fair rental value or fair market rental means the

amount for which the property in question could be leased in
the market with a willing lessor and a willing lessee dealing
at

arms1

length,

neither

being

compelled

to

lease

the

property, and is the equivalent of the amount for which a
willing lessor and a willing lessee would be willing to lease
the property in its present condition.
25.

The fair market rental of the properry is dependent

upon the market place and a rental figure which is in excess
of that which a willing lessee would be willing to pay for
the lease of the property is excessive and does not represent
the true fair market rental value.
26.

The property which is the subject matter of this

action has been utilized for many years for the purpose of
growing alfalfa.
27.

There is a market in the Weber County area for

rental of unimproved property for alfalfa fields, and other
agricultural purposes.
28.

The highest and best use for the property which is

the subject of this action, in its present state, is for
agricultural purposes for either alfalfa, melons, Christmas
9

trees, or other such similar agricultural use and the sum of
$75.00 per acre times 20 acres or a total sum of $1,500.00
per year is the reasonable fair market rental value of the
property

which

should

be

credited

to

the

Combes

as

a

deduction from the refund to be paid by the Combes to the
Plaintiffs.
29.
property

The ultimate highest and best use
is for residential

for the real

development, but in order to

achieve the highest and best use, substantial time, money and
effort must be expended to achieve the highest and best use.
30.

The

highest

and

best

use

of

the

property

(residential development) requires that it be platted, the
appropriate

governmental

agency

approve

the plat

and the

property be developed with the addition of water, sewer and
utilities, curb, gutter and roadway.
31.
there

For the years 1980, 1981, 1982 and in to 1982,

was

a

substantial

dispute

among

the

various

governmental entities as to which entity would provide sewer
services to the property in question.
32.

Shortly after the Plaintiffs entered into the Real

Estate Contract to purchase the land they proceeded forward
to attempt to get the property platted, the plat approved and
sewer and water available for development of the property.
10

33.

As

governmental

a

result

entities

of

as

the

to

dispute

.the

between

sewer

various

connection,

the

Plaintiffs did not develop the property for a period of time.
34.

Whether

or not the property

could

be developed

economically without attachment to a community sewer system
and whether or not the moratorium issued by the governmental
authorities
questions

prohibited

which

development

substantially

of

impacted

the
upon

property
the

were

economic

feasibility of developing the property during the first few
years

after

Plaintiffs

had

entered

into

the Real

Estate

Contract with Defendants and delayed the development of the
property.
35.

The

Plaintiffs

proceeded

forward

to

attempt

to

develop the property through the years 1980, 1981, and 1982,
and in the process of attempting to develop the property, had
hired

the services of Great Basin Engineering

to perform

percolation tests, to prepare a plat for the property, and to
assist the Plaintiffs in obtaining subdivision approval from
the government authorities.

In addition, the Plaintiffs had

worked with the governmental authorities in an attempt to
resolve the dispute between the governmental entities as to
which

entity

would

provide

the

property.
11

sewer

services

to

the

36.

The property has subsequently been annexed

as a

result of the efforts of the Plaintiffs, and sewer connection
is now available and because of the present condition of the
property and the zoning and the community services available,
the property can now be developed for residential use.
37.
ran

When the Plaintiffs discovered that the easement

diagonally

across

the

property,

consisted

of

a 30'

easement and had other attendant difficulties attached to the
easement, they expended a substantial quantity of time and
money in an effort to see if they could overcome the effect
of the easement and to develop the property economically.
38.
that

they

profitable

During the summer of 1984, the Plaintiffs concluded
would

be unable to develop

manner,

given

the

extent

the property
and

nature

of

in a
the

easement and the cost to overcome the difficulties posed by
the easement and those which might be posed by the easement
in the event the restrictions and conditions regarding the
easement were enforced rigidly, and the Plaintiffs went to
the Combes to ask the Combes to make a concession in the
purchase price so that they could proceed forward to develop
the property in a profitable manner.
39.

Keith Combe refused to grant a price concession and

the Plaintiffs filed legal action.
12

40.

The

Defendants1

expert

witness

and

appraiser,

William Christensen, did not give testimony as to the fair
market

rental

value

of

the

property,

but

instead,

gave

testimony of the fair rate of return that might be expected
from the profitable development of real estate based upon an
assumption

of

an

expected

annual

rate

of

return

on the

investment at the rate of approximately 10% per year or an
annual expected rate of return in the amount of $49,350.00
per year; and then testified that the expected annual rate of
return on the investment at a fixed percentage of return
would

be

equated

to

fair market

rental.

The

appraiser

testified, however, that the definition of fair market value
was the most probable sale price that would occur when two
people were to negotiate at arms' length with neither being
compelled to sell or to purchase, and that if there were no
buyer at the asking price, that the law of supply and demand
would cause the price to be dropped until it reached the
level of demand.
41.
expected

Since

no

potential

lessee

could

be

reasonably

to pay $49,350.00 a year for the rental of the

property, the expected rate of return did not equate to the
fair market rental of the property and could not be utilized
for the purpose of determining the fair market rental of the
13

property.
42.

The

Defendants

offered

no

other

testimony

concerning the fair market rental of the property other than
the testimony of William Christensen as to the fair rate of
return that a person might expect on an investment, and which
rate of return was not the equivalent of the fair market
rental of the property,
43.
Plaintiffs

The issue of the amount of the payments made by the
to

the

Defendants

was resolved

by

stipulation

between the parties•
44.

The only remaining issue to be determined was the

fair market rental value of the property.
45.

The matter before the court was and is an issue of

equitable restitution and the Defendants are not entitled to
a jury trial on the equitable issues.
46.

The matter was not one which should have been

submitted to a jury for the following reasons:
a.

The

Plaintiffs

and the

Defendants had

stipulated as to the amounts which had been paid by
the Plaintiffs to the Defendants for principal and
interest and had stipulated as to the amounts which
the Plaintiffs had paid for taxes

and there was no

issue to be resolved concerning the payments made
14

by the Plaintiffs.
b.

The amount of interest to be credited to

the Plaintiffs was not contested by the Defendants.
c.

There was only one remaining issue to be

resolved, and that was the fair market rental value
of the property,
d.

There was no evidence or testimony offered

by the Defendants of the fair market rental value
of the property.
e.

The

only

evidence

of the

fair market

rental value of the property was offered by the
Plaintiffs and that value did not exceed the sum of
$1,500.00 per year.
f.

The case involved issues of equity and the

jury opinion would have been advisory only.
g.

There was nothing left to submit to the

jury since there was no evidence of fair market
rental other than that submitted by the Plaintiffs.
47.

The Court determined that the matter should not be

submitted to the jury for an advisory opinion and the Court
determined that it should rule on the facts and the law and
should grant the Plaintiffs* Motion for a Directed Verdict
and/or for a Judgment.
15
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48.

The Plaintiffs were entitled to a directed verdict

and/or a judgment to be entered in their behalf in the amount
Plaintiffs had paid to Defendants and had paid for taxes on
the real property, and for the interest which had accrued
thereon from the date of the payments, and the Defendants
were entitled to a credit for the fair market rental value of
the property, together with interest thereon, which the Court
determined did not exceed the sum of $1,500.00 a year.
49.

The

Defendants

Keith

P.

Combe

and

Evelyn

Combe

received 74.6% of the payments and the benefit thereon, and
the Defendant First Security Bank as trustee for Clair C.
Combe received 25.4% of the payments and the benefit thereon.
The Court having made and entered its Findings of Fact,
now makes and enters the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

This is a case in equity and the only issues being

tried are those of equitable restitution upon a judgment of
rescission.
2.

The Defendants are not entitled to a jury.

The

Court accommodated the Defendants1 request for a jury with
the

anticipation

that

the

jury would

render

an

advisory

opinion.
3.

The combination of: the issue of the amount of the

payments

made

by

Plaintiffs

to

Defendants

having

been

resolved by stipulation between the parties; and the amount
of the interest due on the payments being uncontested by the
Defendants; and the failure of the Defendants to provide
competent evidence to demonstrate that the fair market rental
of the property

exceeded

the sum of $1,500-00 per year;

constituted sufficient cause and justification for the Court
to determine and conclude that there was nothing left to
submit to the jury and that it would be improper to submit
the matter to the jury,
4.

The Court was justified in dismissing the jury and

in granting

a directed

verdict, and/or Judgment

for the

Plaintiffs for the sums of money paid by the Plaintiffs and
as

stipulated

by

the

parties

and

in

awarding

to

the

defendants a credit in an amount equal to the maximum amount
demonstrated to be the fair rental value of the property.
5.

The

Plaintiffs

are

entitled

to

a

Judgment

determining that they paid to the Defendants the total sum of
$216,069.69

in payments on principal and interest and the

additional sum of $15,133.00 for real estate taxes for a
total agreed upon payment by the Plaintiffs to the Defendants
for principal, interest and taxes in the sum of $231,202.00.
6.

The Plaintiffs are entitled to a Judgment awarding
17

them prejudgment interest from the date of the payment of the
principal,

interest and taxes

in the sum of $13 3,19 2.64,

together with the additional sum of $5,764.21 representing
the interest to March 1, 1988.
7.

The Defendants are entitled to a credit against the

judgment for the reasonable rental of the property for the
years

1980,

1981,

1982,

1983,

and

1984

in

the

sum

of

$1,500.00 per year for a total sum of $7,500.00 credit with
interest

thereon

at

the

rate

of

10% per

annum,

to and

including the 22nd day of September, 1987, in the sum of
$3,562.50 and from September 22, 1987 to March 1, 1988 in the
sum of $330.82, for a total credit of $11,392.82.
8.

The Defendants introduced no credible or competent

evidence or testimony to demonstrate that the fair market
rental

of

the

property

would

have

exceeded

the

sum

of

$1,500.00 per year.
9.

The Plaintiffs are entitled to prejudgment interest

at the legal rate of 10% per annum from the date each payment
was made by the Plaintiffs to the Defendants.
10.

In an equitable case of rescission, the Plaintiffs

are entitled to a refund of the payments they have made,
including both principal and interest, and payments of real
property taxes and the Defendants are entitled to a credit
18

for the fair market rental value of the property during the
time that the Plaintiffs had possession or control over the
property.
11.

The expected rate of return on an investment is not

equivalent to the fair market rental value of property in
question.
12.
question

The
in

highest

its

and

present

best

use

condition

of

was

the property
for

in

agricultural

purposes.
13.

The ultimate highest and best use of the property

was for residential development purposes, but Defendants were
not entitled to a credit for the fair market rental value of
the

property

in

its

final

development

stage

since

that

contemplated the expenditure of substantial sums of money to
develop the property, the obtaining of governmental approval
and the uncertainties of the profitability of such a venture.
14.

The issue of either the Plaintiffs' knowledge of

the easement or the Defendants1 knowledge of the easement, is
not relevant in an action for equitable restitution where the
Court has rescinded the Contract for the reason that the
sellers are unable to convey the title the sellers contracted
to convey in the Real Estate Contract.
15.

The

Plaintiffs

are

entitled
19

to

have

judgment

entered in their behalf and against the Defendants Combes for
the sums found, less the credit for the fair market rental
value of the property, together with interest and costs.
16.

The Plaintiffs are entitled to a vendee's lien upon

the property until the judgment awarded the Plaintiffs has
been paid in full.
Dated this

/h

day of March, 1988.

BY THE COURT:

RONALD 0. HYDE, JU0GE
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law to the following,
this 2

day of March, 1988.

Erik Strindberg, Esq.
John Ashton, Esq.
City Center One, Suite 900
175 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Bruce A. Maak, Esq.
185 South State, #1300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Bernard L. Allen, Esq.
2568 Washington Blvd.
Ogden, Utah 844 01
Theodore E. Kannell, Esq.
650 Clark Learning Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
David E. West, Esq.
1300 Walker Building
Salt Lake City,' Utah 84111
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Jack L. Schoenhals (#2881)
Attorney for Plaintiffs
1200 Beneficial Life Tower
3 6 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 538-2344

SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR WE3ER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
BREUER-HARRISON, INC., CASPER
J. BREUER AND WILLIAM M.
HARRISON,

SECOND REVISED JUDGMENT

Plaintiffs,
Civil No. 090135
vs.
KEITH P. COMBE, EVELYN COMBE,
ROBERT E. FROERER, ATTORNEYS
TITLE GUARANTY FUNDING, AND
FIRST SECURITY BANK, N.A.,
TRUSTEE,
KEITH P. COMBE, EVELYN COMBE
AND FIRST SECURITY BANK, N.A.,
OGDEN, UTAH, as Trustee for
CLAIR C. COMBE,
Civil No. 90793

Plaintiffs,

vs.
CASPER J. BREUER AND WILLIAM
M. HARRISON,
Defendants.
The

above-entitled

matter came on regularly

commencing on September 22, 1987, at 9:30
Honorable

Ronald

0.

Hyde,

District

EXHIBIT H

Judge,

a.m.,
on

for trial
before the

the

limited

\ , « . . * $ &
Indexed

issues of the total amount of payments made by Plaintiffs to
the

Defendants

Keith

P.

Combe,

Evelyn

Combe

and

First

Security Bank, N,A., Ogden Utah, as Trustee for Clair C.
Combe, and the amount of restitution and/or refund to be paid
by the Defendants Keith P. Combe, Evelyn Combe, and Clair C.
Combe

(substituted party for First Security Bank), to the

Plaintiffs,
regarding

the

Court

having

determined

that

the

issues

the claims of the Plaintiffs against Robert E.

Froerer and the Attorneys Title Guaranty Fund were to have
been severed and tried at a subsequent date, and the said
parties not being present, but their counsel being present to
observe

the

participate
Harrison

proceedings,
in

being

the
present

but

not

proceedings,
and

being

the

having been

permitted

Plaintiff
sworn

and

to

William
having

given testimony, and being represented by Jack L. Schoenhals,
the Defendants Keith P. Combe and Evelyn Combe having been
present and having been sworn and having given testimony, and
being represented by John Ashton- and Erik Strindberg; the
interests of Claim C. Combe being represented by counsel for
Keith P. Combe and Evelyn Combe; the parties having called
additional witnesses who were sworn and having

introduced

testimony and evidence, and the Court having received the
same, both the Plaintiffs and the Defendants Keith P. Combe
2
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and Evelyn Combe having rested their case, and the matter
having been fully argued and presented before the Court, and
the

Court

having

granted

the

Plaintiffs'

Motion

for

a

Directed Verdict and for a Judgment, the Court having made
and entered its FINDINGS OF FACT and CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, now
therefore:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED AS FOLLOWS:
1.

The Plaintiffs be and the same are hereby awarded a

judgment against the Defendants Keith P. Combe and Evelyn
Combe,

calculated

as

follows:

the

sum

of

$231,202-00,

together with pre-judgment interest in the sum of $133,192.64
and $5,764.21, for a total sum of $370,158.85 x 74.6%, for a
total

judgment

against

Keith

P.

Combe

and

Evelyn

Combe,

jointly and severally, in the sum of $276,138.50, and the
Plaintiffs be and the same are hereby awarded a judgment
against the Defendant Clair C. Combe, calculated as follows:
the sum of $231,202.00, together with pre-judgment interest
in the sum of $133,192.64 and $5,764.21, for a total sum of
$370,158.85 x 25.4%, for a total judgment against Clair C.
Combe

in

the

sum

of

$94,020.35, together

with

interest

thereon against the said Defendants at the rate of 12% per
annum from the date hereof until paid.
2.

The Defendants Keith P. Combe, Evelyn Combe, and
3
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Clair C. Combe, be, and the same are hereby awarded a credit
against the aforesaid

Judgment

in the sum of $11,392*82,

which credit represents the fair market rental value of the
property during the years 1980, 1981, 1982, 1983 and 1984.
3.

The Plaintiffs be and the same are hereby awarded a

vendee's lien on the property which is the subject matter of
this action and which is described as follows, which lien
shall

remain

upon

and

against

the

following

described

property until the aforesaid judgment, together with interest
and costs is paid in full.

The real property is described as

follows:
PARCEL 1;
Beginning at the Southwest corner of the Northwest
Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of Section 23,
Township 5 North, Range 1 West, Salt Lake Meridian,
U.S. Survey; and running thence East 23 8 feet,
thence North 900 feet, more or less, to the center
of Combe Road, thence Northwesterly along said
centerline to a point North of beginning, thence
South 930 feet, more or less, to the place of
beginning. Containing 5 acres, more or less.
PARCEL 2:
Beginning at a point 7 63 feet East of the Southwest
corner of the Northwest Quarter of the Northwest
Quarter of Section 23, Township 5 North, Range 1
West, Salt Lake Meridian, U.S. Survey: Running
thence East 174.3 6 feet; thence North 625 feet,
more or less, to the centerline of' Combe Road,;
thence Northwesterly along said centerline to a
point North of beginning; thence South 750 feet,
more or less, to the point of beginning.
Containing 2.75 acres.

4

1351

•TTol
Recorded Book i . . - i . v

Page . .. ii 3

A....

Indexed

PARCEL

3:

Beginning at a point 937.36 feet East of the
Southwest corner of the Northwest Quarter of the
Northwest Quarter of Section 23, Township 5 North,
Range 1 West, Salt Lake Meridian, U.S. Survey;
running
thence
East
60.73
feet;
thence
Northeasterly to a point on the center of Combe
Road, said point being East 197.88 feet and North
0°04"30" West 571,02 feet to the centerline of
Combe Road and Northwesterly along said centerline
15 feet; thence Northwesterly along centerline of
said road to a point North of beginning; thence
South 625 feet to the place of beginning.
PARCEL 4:
Beginning at a point 238 feet East of the Southwest
corner of the Northwest Quarter of the Northwest
Quarter of Section 23, Township 5 North, Range 1
West, Salt Lake Meridian, U.S. Survey; and running
thence East 2 50 feet, thence North 83 5 feet, more
or less, to the center of Combe Road, thence
Northwesterly along said centerline to a point
North of beginning; thence South 900 feet, more or
less, to the place of beginning.
Containing 5
acres, more or less.
PARCEL 5:
Beginning 488 feet East of the Southwest corner of
the Northwest Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of
Section 23, Township 5 North, Range 1 West, Salt
Lake Base and Meridian; and running thence East 275
feet, thence North 750 feet, more or less, to the
center of the County Road, thence Northwesterly
along the center of said County Road to a point
North 835 feet, more or less, from the point of
beginning, thence South 83 5 feet, more or less, to
the point of beginning. Containing 3.4 0 acres.
4.

The Plaintiffs be and the same -are hereby awarded

their costs of Court.
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